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SECURITIES LAW'S DIRTY LITTLE SECRET
Usha Rodrigues*
Securities law's dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to
special kinds of investments-hedge funds, private equity, private
companies-that everyone else does not. This disparity stems from the fact
that, from its inception, federal securities law has jealously guarded the
manner in which firms can sell shares to the general public. Perhaps
paternalistically, the law assumes that the average investor needs the
protection of the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be
limited to buying public securities. In contrast, accredited-i.e., wealthy-
investors, who it is presumed can fend for themselves, have the luxury of
choosing between the public and private markets.
This Article uses the emergence of new secondary markets in the shares
of private companies to illustrate the above disparity, which has long
characterized the world of investment access. First, focusing narrowly on
these markets reveals their troubling potential effects on the venture capital
world, a vital source of startup funding. More broadly, these new
secondary markets bring to light the stark contrasts in investing power and
access that have always been securities law's dirty little secret: by making
it easier for accredited investors to wield their special privilege, the new
markets just make the disparity of investment access more obvious. For
example, after Facebook's initial public offering, it was widely reported
that accredited investors had been buying shares of the high-profile
company in the three years before it rather disastrously went public-at
which point the big money had already been made.
Thus, the increased transparency that the secondary markets bring to the
world of private investment makes our overall securities law newly
vulnerable to a fundamental critique: government intervention has created
an investing climate that lets the rich get richer, while the poor get left
behind. The Article acknowledges elements keeping the current system in
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place, explaining the current inequality of investor access by way of public
choice theory: regulators and companies alike favor the status quo.
Viewed from the perspective of the little guy, however, inequality in
investment access may prove less defensible and ultimately less tenable. I
suggest a modest fix: letting the general public participate in the private
market via mutual fund investment, something it currently cannot do.
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INTRODUCTION
F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, "[The rich] are different than you and me."'
Apocrypha has it that he once remarked as much to Ernest Hemingway.
"Yes," Hemingway is said to have replied, "they have more money." 2 The
dirty little secret of U.S. securities law is that the rich not only have more
1. F. Scor FITZGERALD, The Rich Boy, in ALL THE SAD YOUNG MEN 5, 5 (James L. W.
West III ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
2. Henry T. Greely, Population Participation and Other Factors That Impact the
Compilation and the Utility of Resulting Databases, 66 LA. L. REv. 79, 87 n.17 (2005).
Hemingway did include this dialogue in the short story The Snows of Kilimanjaro. ERNEST
HEMINGWAY, The Snows of Kilimanjaro, in THE SNOWS OF KILIMANJARO AND OTHER
STORIES 3, 23 (Simon & Schuster, First Scribner Paper Fiction ed. 1995).
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money-they also have access to types of wealth-generating investments
not available, by law, to the average investor. An investor with enough
income or a high enough net worth (an accredited investor3) can invest in a
private equity fund, for example, or in still-private companies before they
go public. The rest of us cannot.4
Take Facebook's initial public offering (IPO). The big news was that,
instead of enjoying the usual first-day run-up in stock price, the company's
shares "wobbled," closing up only 0.6 percent from the $38 offering
price-a disappointing return, particularly since Facebook's IPO was the
most ballyhooed in recent memory and the largest U.S. technology
company IPO of all time.5 Its stock plunged 13 percent the next trading
day; recriminations and lawsuits swiftly followed, largely centering on the
conduct of the investment banks that underwrote the offering and on the
delays and logjams in first-day trading. 6 The not-so-big news, however,
was that the seeds for the lackluster IPO were sown long before the last-
minute machinations of Facebook's underwriters or NASDAQ's technical
glitches. The demand for shares had to some extent already been met on
the private market. In other words, the real story, as Fortune's Joshua
Brown told readers three months before the IPO, was that "Facebook
already went public, you just weren't invited."7
3. Rule 506 of Regulation D describes several categories of accredited investors,
including certain banks, charitable organizations, and certain high net worth individuals, who
may invest in securities that are not registered. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2012). Most notably
for the purposes of this Article, individuals with a net annual income of over $200,000 or a
total net worth of over one million dollars may invest in securities that are not registered,
provided that those securities meet the general disclosure requirements of Rule 502. Id.
§ 230.501(a)(5)-(6).
4. A 2008 study determined that between 5 and 7.2 million Americans qualified as
accredited investors but only 10.5 percent of such investors actually participated in "informal
investments" in the prior three years. Scott Shane, How Dodd's Reform Plan Hurts Startup
Finance, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/
mar2010/sb20100318_367600.htm. In 2004, 8.47 percent of U.S. households qualified as
accredited investors. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities
Act Release No. 8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116,45,119 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007).
5. See Shayndi Raice et al., Facebook's Launch Sputters-Underwriters Forced to
Prop Up IPO of Social Network; Only a 23-Cent Rise, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2012, at Al;
Susanna Kim, Facebook IPO: $38 Shares Biggest Tech Offer, ABC NEWS (May 17, 2012,
4:45 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2012/05/facebook-ipo-38-shares-biggest-
tech-offer/.
6. See, e.g., Julianne Pepitone, Facebook IPO: What the %$#! Happened?, CNN
MONEY (May 23, 2012, 6:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/23/technology/facebook-
ipo-what-went-wrong/index.htm (describing many of the problems that occurred on the first
day of the Facebook IPO).
7. Joshua Brown, Facebook Already Went Public, You Weren't Invited, CNN MONEY
(Feb. 8, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/02/08/facebook-ipo-numbers/
("On February 1, Facebook at long last filed its official S-1 document with the SEC, the first
step toward an initial public offering (IPO) the company expects to do in the second quarter
of this year. Despite the fact that it was widely anticipated, the financial media went
absolutely bananas. Facebook was the only subject on television, the radio, the web and in
the paper. For a week. But lost in all of this saliva-covered enthusiasm was the fact that
Facebook's de facto IPO had already occurred a long time ago.").
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For three years prior to the IPO, accredited investors could buy into
Facebook using two new websites, SharesPost and SecondMarket. These
sites have created a national secondary market for private company shares.
Investors use these websites to buy shares from earlier investors or
employees looking to sell. Some accredited investors bought into Facebook
early at remarkably low prices, ranging from $1.11 to $9.82 per share, and
enjoyed tremendous returns when the IPO occurred (although the very last
investors overpaid relative to the IPO price, with the final private auctions
closing above $40 per share).8
So far commentators have paid scant attention to this vibrant secondary
market, and the few scholars who have written on the emergence of the
private secondary market have treated it as a positive development. 9
Commentators have assumed that a more robust secondary market will
spark a virtuous cycle: increased liquidity will attract more investment,
which will in turn lead to increased liquidity as more investors put more
money into more companies.10
Time will tell. Two considerations, however, give me pause about the
claimed virtues of this supposedly value-adding development. First, there
are costs as well as benefits to providing a "new exit" for venture capital."
Venture capital, a major source of private funding for startups, is sometimes
described as the "smart money"-valuable because of the advice and
expertise that accompany its dollars.12 If part of venture capital's value is
the motivation of sophisticated investors to work with a company over time
to improve it, then giving them an early exit may do more harm than good.
By converting venture capital investment into something akin to an option,
secondary markets might decrease venture capitalists' incentives to nurture
and monitor the internal workings of their fledgling portfolio companies.
As "dumb money" (as we may term the faceless accredited investors on
SharesPost and SecondMarket) replaces the "smart money," monitoring and
nurturing may diminish, while the risk of fraud or mismanagement may in
turn go up.13
8. David Cohen, SecondMarket Bids Goodbye to Facebook with Interactive Timeline,
ALLFACEBOOK (May 18, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://allfacebook.com/facebook-on-secondmarket
_b89385.
9. Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1, 15 (2012)
("VC secondary markets offer an important release valve for the increasing pressure on
traditional exits.").
10. Id. at 21-24.
11. Id. at 27-29.
12. Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive
Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REv. 41, 81 n. 173
(2008).
13. Angel investors are sometimes derisively termed the "dumb money." See Morton A.
Cohen, Remarks at Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference on
Comparative Legal Aspects of Entrepreneurship in Canada and the United States: Private
Financing of Entrepreneurships (Apr. 13-14, 2007), in 33 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 98, 103 (2007).
Yet accredited investors buying on the secondary market, with no bargained-for rights or
personal relationships to the company, must be in this sense dumber still. They bring
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Second, the connection between the secondary market and capital
acquisition is not airtight. Pre-SharesPost accredited investors directly
contributed to the capital and (at least theoretically) growth of the
companies in which they invested. In contrast, the corporations whose
shares are bought and sold on SharesPost do not receive a penny of
accredited investors' money because it is not the corporations that sell
shares, but rather early investors and current and former employees with
vested stock options. This is a secondary market, not a primary market
through which a capital-seeking firm itself swaps securities for cash. So the
new secondary market offers wealthy investors opportunities closed to
unaccredited investors, just like the old regime-but without the direct
gains in capital formation that used to accompany accredited investment.
Of course, a vibrant secondary market increases the price that shares will
fetch on the primary market; the possibility of resale increases the price of a
product. And such gains may offset the losses in expertise described above.
Indeed, if rewarding early investors with liquidity causes more angell4 and
venture capital investment, then the changes in the secondary markets will
ultimately pay off in increased capital formation. Still, the new money does
not flow directly into the company's coffers, as it did under the old
accredited investor regime, so it is possible that the new secondary
investors are cannibalizing the company's own stock sales.
Additionally, speculation is a zero-sum game, where two parties make a
bet on the value of a stock. For every dollar one side gains, the other side
must lose.15 Given that transaction costs must exist on both sides, and that
they are higher in the private secondary market than in the public one, the
fact that secondary markets by their nature encourage speculative trading
may prove a net social cost.
My suggestion thus far has been that the advent of private secondary
markets may have upset the traditional balance in securities law by diluting
the commitment of venture capitalists and by loosening the connection
between capital and investment. Yet these new markets present one more
cost, one with ramifications outside the confines of the venture capital
nothing to the table but their wallets-and even those do not contribute capital to the
company directly. As Part II.B.1 will discuss, some buyers on the secondary market are
extremely sophisticated, making it quite inaccurate to characterize them as "dumb," meaning
the antithesis of "smart." For example, Elevation Partners, a private equity firm that counts
the musician Bono among its founding partners, bought Facebook shares on the secondary
market. See Dan Primack, No, Facebook Did Not Make Bono World's Richest Musician,
CNN MONEY (May 18, 2012, 5:39 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/18/no-
facebook-did-not-make-bono-worlds-richest-musician/. Yet in another sense of the term
these purchasers remain "dumb" as compared to traditional venture capitalists because they
own simple common stock, they lack special board representatives, veto rights, and the
traditional "voice" in the management of the corporation that preferred shareholders
typically enjoy.
14. For an explanation of angel investors, see infra Part I.A. 1.
15. Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure,
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REv. 611, 622 (1995).
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world. These secondary markets might appear to the ordinary citizen as
nothing more than stock exchanges for the rich, from which the general
public is unjustifiably shut out. Because of current regulations, average
investors cannot even participate in these markets indirectly by way of
mutual funds. Thus, the overall impression may be of an America where
those who are already wealthy can cash in on investments that make them
even wealthier, while average Joes can only press their noses up against the
glass and await an IPO-at which point, as with Facebook, the big money
has already been made. There have been reports of such sentiments in the
popular press. 16 And the perception that the public stock market is for
chumps and suckers should not be taken lightly.
The second part of this Article will use these new secondary markets as a
prism through which to view the state of securities law-from the novel
perspective of the little guy. The new secondary market websites did not
create a disparity in investment opportunity; U.S. securities law has always
allowed wealthy investors to enter certain markets (including not only the
market for private company investments but also private equity funds and
hedge funds), while cordoning off average (retail) investors from the same
opportunities. I will argue that the disparate treatment of investors is not
the product of sinister conspiracy, but rather an unintended consequence of
the original driving force of securities regulation: investor protection.
16. See, e.g., Daniel Gross, Facebook's IPO Already Happened-Several Months Ago
on Secondmarket, YAHOO! FIN. (May 21, 2012, 9:44 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/
daniel-gross/facebook-ipo-already-happened-several-months-ago-secondmarket-
134457488.html ("Thanks to SecondMarket, big-shot investors no longer have to wait until
an IPO to express their enthusiasm about a company. And that means the froth and pop that
used to take place exclusively on the NASDAQ or the NYSE in the opening trading days can
now take place weeks or even months before the official IPO. That's clearly what happened
with Facebook."); Joseph Menn, Insight: Pre-IPO Stock Trading Boom Could Be Scary for
Investors, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2012, 4:39 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
03/15/us-secondary-trading-idUSBRE82EOCD20120315 (subheading titled "Special Rules
for the Rich"); Nancy Miller, Forget Facebook: Why Regular Joes Can't Invest in the
Decade's Hottest IPO-and Probably Shouldn't Try, TIME Bus. (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/04/25/forget-facebook-why-regular-joes-cant-invest-in-the-
decades-hottest-ipo-and-probably-shouldnt-try/ ("The big boys are at the front [ofl the line,
you are at the back of the line, and there is no middle of the line."); John Shinal, Easy
Facebook Money Already Made, MARKET WATCH (Feb. 2, 2012), http://articles.market
watch.com/2012-02-02/commentary/31028965_l-ipo-share-facebook-shares-facebook-ipo
("Facebook shares have been trading for several years now on private, secondary markets
that cater to wealthy investors. The liquidity that those markets provided is what allowed
Facebook to achieve its lofty valuation-and raise a massive amount of capital before it had
even filed its first IPO documents. Because Facebook insiders who wanted to sell portions
of their stakes-and the investors who were determined to buy them-have already done so,
the easy money in Facebook shares has already been made."); James Temple, Facebook IPO
Underscores Shutting Out the Masses, SF GATE (May 22, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.sf
gate.com/business/article/Facebook-IPO-underscores-shutting-out-the-masses-3575283.php
("'Facebook left nothing for the common investor,' Forbes Publisher Rich Karlgaard wrote.
'The insider pig pile of (private equity) firms and celebrity Silicon Valley angels took it all.
This is a rather new, post-Sarbanes-Oxley fact, and it should make Americans very, very
angry.').
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Put simply, the 1933 Securities Act embraced the principle that securities
are dangerous and thus should only be sold to the public with lots of
protections in place, most notably mandatory disclosure and liability for
misstatements. A small exemption was carved out for private offerings,
where the purchasers did not need securities law's protections. Securities
law's emphasis-then, as now-was on who was permitted to sell securities
rather than who was permitted to buy them. Thus, private firms are only
able to sell their shares to a subset of the public-the wealthy.
Such segregation in the marketplace may be all to the good. Professor
Lynn Stout has argued that the public markets enable an excess of
speculative trading.' 7 Professor Adam Pritchard has recently argued for
abolishing IPOs because of the speculative frenzy they create for retail
investors and the meager returns they offer.' 8 Modem portfolio theory,
which held sway at least before the financial crisis of 2008, counseled that
the best investment strategy is buying and holding a diversified portfolio,
ideally in a passively managed fund.19 It cautioned that it is a fool's errand
to try to outsmart the market, either by one's self or via an actively
managed fund. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that, for all their
exclusivity, private equity investments might not regularly outperform the
broader stock market after all.20
Yet the general public might well benefit if, through mutual funds, they
could invest at least a portion of their wealth in private companies, hedge
funds, or private equity funds. Modem portfolio theory teaches that
moderate exposure to a broad range of investment types, each with a
different risk profile, is the safest and surest path to wealth gain.21 While
17. See Stout, supra note 15, at 687-88.
18. See A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting "Truth in Securities" Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and
Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 999 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,
53 UCLA L. REv. 601, 632 (2006); Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 21 (2008) ("Prior to the adoption of
portable alpha, modem portfolio theory focused on diversification as the dominant method
for managing risk. In its simplest form, modem portfolio theory cautions investors to
maintain a diversified mix of stocks, bonds, and cash in order to balance the volatility of
their portfolios with the desire to maximize returns. Under this theory, only a small amount
of assets would be placed in risky alternative asset classes like real estate, venture capital,
buyout funds, and hedge funds."). Harry Markowitz won the Nobel Prize in Economics for
developing the theory. Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is
Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 851, 858 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Lydie N.C. Pierre-Louis, Hedge Fund Fraud and the Public Good,
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 44 (2009); Larry Swedroe, Hedge Funds Lag Traditional
Asset Classes, CBS MONEYWATCH (Oct. 12, 2012, 9:50 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-505123_162-57529997/hedge-funds-lag-traditional-asset-classes/. The private equity
and venture capital data is mixed. See Robert S. Harris et al., Private Equity Performance:
What Do We Know? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17874, 2012),
available at http://areas.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/finance/PERC/HJK 01-1 3.pdf.
21. See Matthew F. Gately, Much Ado About Nothing: An Analysis of the "Accredited
Natural Person " Standard, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 760, 780-81 ("According to modem
portfolio theory, investors can minimize risk by holding a diversified portfolio, which occurs
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undeniably risky, investment in private firms offers the potential for high
returns; like foreign investments, domestic stocks of large and small
publicly traded firms, bonds, and real estate, it has its place in a balanced
portfolio. But such investments are currently out of reach for the average
investor.
The logical question, and the one this Article will conclude by
addressing, is why a democratic political system has allowed such unequal
treatment to continue. Public choice theory provides an answer: collective
action problems and the SEC's limited appetite for increasing investor
exposure to risky assets has combined to sustain the status quo. Investors
are rationally ignorant and apathetic, and regulators' incentives are skewed
against enlarging investment access in an area that (1) offers little for the
rent-seeking regulator and (2) could cause average investors to lose their
shirts. And so differential investor access has long remained securities
law's dirty little secret. 22
Yet times may be changing. The new secondary markets, by broadening
the number of investors that can participate in this privileged market, have
increased its visibility and could provide the impetus for reform.
Additionally, section 201 of the JOBS Act 23 lifted the prohibition on
general solicitation for private companies and funds, while retaining the
requirement that only accredited investors may actually invest. This change
means that the general public may soon, for the first time, hear
advertisements for these once-secretive investments on the radio, TV, and
internet-even though they are barred from actually investing. Thus,
section 201 further increases the visibility of exotic investments that remain
tantalizingly out of reach of the common man. If such visibility increases
the pressure for reform, this Article proposes a regulatory change that
would allow ordinary investors access, by way of mutual fund-like
investments, to the private market.
This Article will proceed in two parts. Part L.A describes traditional
private market investment. Next, Part I.B introduces the new secondary
markets, explaining how they work and how they have been received in the
literature thus far. It then explores the potential problems they present for
the venture capital ecosystem. Part II pulls back and reflects on the larger
issue of inequality of investment opportunity. After tracing the history of
the accredited investor exemption in Part II.A, Part II.B reviews securities
when returns from the various securities in an investor's portfolio are unrelated to each
other.").
22. More specifically, while many people may understand that exclusive entities like
hedge funds exist, far fewer realize that access to special private investments may be just out
of reach, available to those with incomes within spitting distance of their own. For example,
a newly minted attorney at a big firm, both well educated and earning $150,000 a year, was
shut out of the secondary market for pre-IPO shares, where her college roommate, now a
pediatrician making $200,000 a year, was not.
23. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313
(2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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literature, which has almost completely ignored the issue of differential
access. Next, Part II.C argues that restriction from an entire class of
investments causes real harm-the inability to diversify an investment
portfolio. Yet public choice theory suggests that the status quo may well
continue: those who stand to benefit most are rationally uninterested, and
the SEC would face political risk far outweighing reward were it to push for
change. Were the political climate to change, however, Part II.D proposes
permitting mutual funds focused on private company investment as a
logical step toward righting the current investment access imbalance.
I. THE WORLD OF PRIVATE COMPANY INVESTMENT
The emergence of the new secondary market created by SharesPost and
SecondMarket introduced a new era of accredited investing. To understand
this new world, however, we must first understand the old one-that is, the
structure within which accredited investing occurred from 1933 until only
three years ago. The literature describes the venture capital world as
fostering a special kind of innovation, using a model of capital formation
much more complex than simply raising money from rich people. Angel
investors and venture capitalists bring valuable qualities and contribute
skills, expertise, and vigilance to the life of a start-up. In contrast, the new
secondary market expands the universe of investors, but more closely
resembles a stock exchange than a traditional venture-financing round.
A. The Old World: Investment in Private Companies
Accredited investors, like retail investors, can choose between individual
or collective investment opportunities-in other words, they can invest in
single companies or in funds. First we will examine cases where accredited
investors seek out individual companies. The most prominent example is
the angel investor.
1. Angel Investors
There is no fixed formula for starting a new corporation, but the early
years of development generally follow a common pattern. Typically,
entrepreneurs begin funding their endeavor with their own cash (sometimes
coupled with credit card debt), and then turn to "family and friends" for
loans or investment via common stock.24 Angel investors step in next,
often providing from $100,000 to $2 million in exchange for company
stock,25 generally on relatively undemanding terms.26 Companies that
24. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the
Economic Impact ofProperty Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59, 87-88 (2007).
25. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior ofAngel Investors, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1405, 1418 (2008).
26. Reports are mixed as to whether angels receive common equity or, like VCs,
preferred stock (which takes priority over common stock). Compare id. at 1422 ("[T]he
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survive and demonstrate promise then seek additional investments from
venture capital funds. Typical infusions of venture capital (VC) money
average between $2 and $10 million.27 If a company is able to attract
several rounds of VC investment, it is often acquired or goes public,
earning the founders and private investors a return many times their original
investment.
Angel investing thus occurs near the beginning of the start-up's life
cycle, at the point when outside investment is first sought. Angel investors
are wealthy individuals, often former entrepreneurs, 28 who aim to provide
seed capital to start-ups. Angel investors are a diverse group, defined
loosely as "wealthy individuals who are not family members or personal
friends of a company's founders." 29  Many angels are experienced
entrepreneurs; others are rich heirs, doctors, or lawyers. 30
Angel investments are risky; one study found that almost two-thirds of
them lose money. 31 However, the same study estimated an average return
of 10 percent per angel investor, 32 indicating that overall angel investing is
still profitable. Why is that? First, angels often spend considerable time
monitoring their investments. 33  Angel investing is a largely local
phenomenon. Close to the action, angels can act as an "informal sounding
board,"34 offering "seasoned advice on and empathy with the many
difficulties faced in advancing an early-stage venture." 35 Second, angels
tend to find investment opportunities via a "network of trust"-through
friends, angel groups, and knowledgeable business contacts. 36 A shared
social network, coupled with attentive monitoring, may make it easier for
angels to separate good investments from bad ones on the front end, and
less likely that the start-up entrepreneurs will take advantage of them on the
traditional angel receives common instead of preferred stock in exchange for her investment.
Wong's survey found that the greatest number of angels took straight common stock, which
tracks anecdotal accounts."), with Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why
Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 107, 127
(2010) ("It is often stated that angel investors are more likely to invest in common than
preferred stock. Recent studies, however, suggest that this perception is no longer accurate
(if it ever was)."). Although angel investors, like VCs, may receive preferred stock, their
rights with respect to dividends, antidilution, and control are weaker than VC's. Id.
27. Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 1416.
28. Id. at 1408.
29. Cable, supra note 26, at 115. Angel networks and funds now exist, as well-about
300 as of 2009. Id. at 117. These groups may act in a more venture capital-like manner than
the traditional angels. Id.
30. Id. at 116.
31. Id. at 128.
32. Id. (citing Robert Wiltbank, At the Individual Level: Outlining Angel Investing in
the United States (Feb. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.marketing
techie.com/articles/angel-investing.pdf).
33. Id. at 130.
34. Id.
35. Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 1419.
36. Cable, supra note 26, at 131.
3398 [Vol. 81
SECURITIES LA W'S DIRTY LITTLE SECRET
back end, due to the reputation costs they would suffer in a close-knit
investment community. 37
2. Venture Capital Funds
Just as retail investors often join forces by investing in mutual funds,
accredited investors can pool capital with their fellows in VC funds, private
equity funds, and hedge funds. 38 While these funds all share the same basic
structure and compensation scheme,39 they differ in character and
investment focus. My primary concern is with VC funds, but I will first
briefly describe private equity and hedge funds to help explain why I am
setting them to one side-at least for now.
Venture capital funds focus on start-ups and normally take only a stake in
the portfolio company. In contrast, private equity funds generally target
mature private or public firms, using debt (the "leverage" in a leveraged
buyout) to take over a firm in toto.40 Private equity managers aim to use
their expertise and a disciplined plan to reduce expenses and improve
operations to generate the cash needed to pay off the debt that paid for the
company. 41 Their goal is to sell the improved or "leaner and meaner"
company for a profit-or to break it up and sell the pieces. Hedge funds-
in contrast to both private equity and venture capital funds-tend to
specialize in short-term trading.42 These investment vehicles focus neither
37. See id.; see also Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 1431 ("Angel investing is highly
localized, relationship-driven, and industry-specific. Angels like to invest in start-ups where
they know either the entrepreneur or the substantive area (e.g., biotechnology or e-
commerce), and preferably both.").
38. Accredited investors are not the only investors in such funds; pension funds,
university endowments, and insurance companies all invest in them as well. William A.
Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
473, 488 (1990). But for the purposes of this Article, the crucial point is that if an individual
wants to invest in such funds qua individual, he or she must be accredited.
39. All three are usually structured as limited partnerships, with the manager serving as
the general partner and the investors as limited partners. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The
Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 764, 806 (2012). Broadly speaking, all use
incentive compensation of "two and twenty," where fund managers receives a modest 2
percent of assets under management, and 20 percent of the profits, perhaps over a given
threshold or "hurdle" rate. See Fleischer, supra note 19, at 3.
40. See Samir D. Parikh, Saving Fraudulent Transfer Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 307
(2012).
41. See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 13 (2008) ("Since most of the 'free cash flow' (essentially operating cash flow minus
capital expenditures) will be committed to debt service, management will be forced to adhere
to strict, results-oriented financial projections.").
42. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1084 (2007) ("For the short-term trading
horizon of hedge funds to generate a short-term investment outlook for hedge fund
managers, the stock market must suffer from myopia: that is, it must undervalue long-term
investments relative to short-term investments." (emphasis omitted)).
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on the start-up nor on the mature company, but instead typically invest in
"publicly traded stock, commodities, and related derivatives." 43
Venture capital funds are the most relevant for the purposes of this
Article because they focus on the kind of venture-backed start-up
companies-such as Facebook, Linkedln, and Groupon-that have so far
dominated trading at SharesPost and SecondMarket. Hedge funds and
private equity funds, however, also remain enclaves for the wealthy. Thus,
if our guiding principle involves skepticism about special rules for the rich,
we should keep hedge funds and private equity funds in view. In Part II.D,
I will return to these sorts of investment vehicles; however, for now we will
set them to one side.
When an established VC firm such as Sequoia or Benchmark organizes a
new fund, it asks accredited investors for a minimum commitment, with
most of the money to be contributed via "capital calls" as the fund needs
more money." The fund is structured as a limited partnership, with the
manager serving as the general partner and the accredited investors,
together with institutional investors such as endowments and pension funds,
serving as limited partners. Venture capital investors entrust their money to
fund managers for a considerable period of time, typically ten years.45
The VC fund's manager then seeks out "portfolio companies" (i.e.,
companies in which it wants to invest). Generally VC funds make several
rounds of investment in these companies, often joining with other VC funds
to make a series of investments at $2 to $10 million per round in exchange
for preferred stock, which receives priority over common stock in certain
situations.46
Venture capital-backed companies are more likely to succeed than non-
VC-backed firms,47 not only because of the capital VCs provide, but also
because they carefully select and monitor their investments. Venture
capitalists almost always are allotted a seat on the board.48 Like angel
investors, VCs are often local and sector specific. 49 They have expertise
43. Cable, supra note 26, at 113.
44. See Rob Garver, Preparing for Private Equity, BANK INVESTMENT CONSULTANT,
Nov. 2007, at 45, 46.
45. Sahlman, supra note 38, at 490.
46. See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARv. L. REV. 874, 875
(2003) ("The capital structures of venture capital-backed U.S. companies share a remarkable
commonality: overwhelmingly, venture capitalists make their investments through
convertible preferred stock.").
47. Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 1411.
48. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment
Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 56 (2009).
49. Accord Dana M. Warren, Venture Capital Investment: Status and Trends, 7 OHIO
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 1, 12 (2012) ("Venture capital investment almost always
involves significant participation in and oversight of each of the portfolio companies by the
venture capital professionals. As a result, simple logistics makes venture capital investment
an inherently local, or at most regional, activity.").
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that can help a young company navigate key decisions; they have
connections that help with recruiting skilled managers; and they have
experience that helps channel and discipline the energy of often-young
entrepreneurs. 50 Conventional wisdom says that venture capital is "smart
money" that has special value for a budding organization.5' The allure of
investing in venture capital funds is clear: venture funds have reportedly
offered returns of approximately 16 to 20 percent a year,52 far more than
what an investor can expect from the public market.53
Although the literature has emphasized differences between angels and
VCs, they share four important characteristics. First, they are both illiquid
investments. Venture capital funds generally invest in portfolio companies
looking for an exit after five to seven years, with an eye toward returning
money to the funds' accredited investors at year ten. Because angels invest
earlier in a company's life cycle, they have an even longer path to
liquidity.54 Second, both angels and VCs are engaged investors. Knowing
their money will be tied up for years, they carefully sift through potential
investments before committing their capital. Third, both angels and venture
capitalists bring knowledge and expertise to their investments, spending
considerable time and energy monitoring the performance of the start-ups in
which they invest. Finally, these investments are profitable. While angel
investment has an element of "for-profit philanthropy,"55 angel investors
achieve results "in the ballpark" of the high-yield venture capitalists.56
50. See Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 1411.
51. Robert C. Illig, Al Gore, Oprah, and Silicon Valley: Bringing Main Street and
Corporate American into the Environmental Movement, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 232
n.34 (2008) (describing venture capitalists' "entrepreneurial savvy, business contacts,
executive talent, and patience of financiers with long experience in helping small companies
succeed") (citing THOMAS M. DOERFLINGER & JACK L. RIVKIN, RISK AND REWARD: VENTURE
CAPITAL AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S GREAT INDUSTRIES 16 (1987)).
52. Lee Harris, A Critical Theory ofPrivate Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 261 (2010).
53. Since venture capital is a private industry, reliable figures on returns are hard to
come by. Moreover, lower performing funds tend to underreport. See, e.g., Marco Da Rin et
al., A Survey of Venture Capital Research, in 2A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE
573, 621 (George Constantinides et al. eds., 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
wl7523.pdf?newwindow=l ("Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) find that funds that do not
report cash flow data in ThomsonOne have a success rate in terms of IPO or acquisitions of
portfolio companies that is five percentage points lower than for funds that report such
data."); Deborah Gage, Venture Capital's Secret-3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2012, at B1 ("Venture capitalists 'bury their dead very quietly' . . . . 'They
emphasize the successes but they don't talk about the failures at all."'). Other estimates
include 17 percent or 14.1 percent. Dar Rin et al., supra at 79-81.
54. See Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 1438 n.169 ("Angels typically have longer exit
horizons than their venture fund counterparts and thus the capital they provide is termed
patient capital." (quoting Jeffrey Sohl, The Early Stage Equity Market in the USA,
1 VENTURE CAPITAL 101, 111 (1999))).
55. Id. at 1409.
56. Cable, supra note 26, at 129.
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Overall, U.S. start-ups are often cited as a model for investment-driven
innovation.57 Both within and outside the United States, governments have
expressed a desire to foster the next Silicon Valley and have looked to the
venture capital model for inspiration.58 Mindful that this sector of the
economy is a critical contributor to overall growth, we turn next to the new
private secondary markets. These markets differ in important ways from
the venture capitalists and angel investors. Faceless internet transactions
replace the careful negotiation, monitoring, and control rights of the venture
capitalists. In assessing the fairness and sustainability of these new
markets, gains achieved by broadening the scope of the investor class
should be weighed against their accompanying costs.
B. The New Secondary Market for Private Shares
In 2009, two different companies began matching buyers and sellers of
private company stock online. For now these two firms, SecondMarket 59
and SharesPost, 60 dominate the market,61 although some competitors have
already emerged, while others are rumored to be close to launching.62 This
market is significant, generating $9.3 billion in trades in 2011 alone.63
Now-public venture-backed companies like Facebook, Twitter, Groupon,
and LinkedIn traded heavily on these sites.64 While most of sites' traffic
comes from classic start-ups, some established private companies-such as
Cargill, Levi's, Publix, Trader Joe's, and In-N-Out Burger-generated
significant interest on SecondMarket in 2011.65 Listing companies
57. See Steven J. Markovich, U.S. Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (June 5, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/us-entrepreneurship-venture-
capital/p28433 ("Entrepreneurship is a primary contributor to job creation and sustainable
economic growth, and policies affecting innovation and startup financing have wide
ramifications."); cf Eric Pfanner, Maker ofAngry Birds Shows Way for European Start-Ups,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 18, 2012, at 17 ("In general, . . . start-ups in Europe often struggle
to get off the ground, finding it harder to raise money at the critical early stages than their
American counterparts.").
58. See Cable, supra note 26, at 107 ("In many respects, current public policy reflects
[an] enthusiasm for startups.").
59. SECONDMARKET, https://www.secondmarket.com/?t-edlogo (last visited Apr. 19,
2013).
60. SHARESPOST, https://welcome.sharespost.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
61. See Evelyn M. Rush & Peter Lattman, Losing a Goose That Laid the Golden Egg,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 2, 2012, 9:26 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/
losing-the-goose-that-laid-the-golden-egg/.
62. See id.
63. Secondary Market Reports-Private Companies, NYPPEX PRIVATE MARKETS,
http://www.nyppex.com/february_201 1_private companies report.php (last visited Apr. 19,
2012). Trading in Facebook accounted for a large portion of this volume. Accord Rush &
Lattman, supra note 61 ("At SecondMarket,... the trading of Facebook shares accounted
for about a third of the firm's total revenue last year.").
64. See Rush & Lattman, supra note 61.
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typically have a valuation of "$100 million or more, hav[e] $10 million or
more of annual revenue, and hav[e] been in business for 5 or more years." 66
In other words, they are fairly large and mature private companies. Some
companies permit wide-open trading. Others authorize sales only during
designated windows of time. 67
SecondMarket, founded in 2004, began to facilitate trades in the private
securities secondary market in 2009.68 It operates as something of an
illiquid asset bazaar, allowing accredited investors to buy interests in exotic
asset classes such as auction-rate securities, bankruptcy claims, and wine.69
SecondMarket's current model requires companies to disclose two years of
financials before their shares can be sold70 and permits the company to
exert control over who may deal in its shares. Its website explains:
SecondMarket will work with the company to identify who should
participate as a buyer or seller in the transaction. The company has full
control over approving the buyers and sellers. The company may limit
buyers to only existing investors, buyers already known to the firm,
buyers SecondMarket introduces or a combination of these individuals.
The company also identifies which sellers are allowed to participate,
whether it's ex-employees, outside investors or certain current employees.
At the end of the selection process, the company has confirmed exactly
who is participating in the program. . . . The company can set any
limitation on the level of seller or buyer participation, including defining
the maximum percentage of ownership possible for any buyer, the
minimum and maximum limit on the number of shares sold, etc.71
The timing of sales is also at the company's discretion: "A company may
decide to conduct a one-time liquidity event or schedule liquidity events on
a quarterly, semiannually, annually or other frequency. This decision is
typically based upon the company's objectives and anticipated liquidity
needs in the future." 72
66. Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 179,
193 n.76 (2012).
67. Richard Teitelbaum, Facebook Drives SecondMarket Broking $1 Billion Private
Shares, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
27/facebook-drives-secondmarket-broking-1-billion-private-shares.html.
68. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 36. For an excellent history of SecondMarket, see
Teitelbaum, supra note 67.
69. See Lee Spears, SecondMarket Acts to Offset Facebook Fees Selling Wine, Art,
BuSINESSWEEK (May 17, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-17/second
market-acts-to-offset-facebook-fees-selling-wine ("SecondMarket's biggest business
segment now is trading fixed income securities, ranging from bankruptcy claims to asset-
backed bonds and auction rate preferred securities, said Bill Siegel, SecondMarket's senior
vice president of new ventures."). Mortgage-backed securities and limited partnership
interests in hedge funds also trade on SecondMarket. Teitelbaum, supra note 67.
70. Steven M. Davidoff, Private Markets Offer Valuable Service but Little Disclosure,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/
private-markets-offer-valuable-service-but-little-disclosure/.





SharesPost, in contrast to SecondMarket, focuses solely on sales of
private company stock. It does not involve the company to the extent that
SecondMarket does-although the company must waive any transfer
restrictions applicable to the shares that are sold. Rather than relying on
company-provided financial information, SharesPost provides potential
buyers access to privately prepared research reports on firms whose shares
are traded.73 It also offers a "Venture-Backed Index" as a barometer to help
investors value companies.74 SharesPost initially attempted to position
itself as a passive bulletin board and resisted registering as a broker-dealer,
but eventually succumbed to the SEC's pressure to do so. 75
While each company strives to differentiate itself from the other, 76 for
the purposes of this Article their similarities outweigh their differences.
Both websites require that buyers be accredited investors. Each employs a
verification process to ensure that the buyer is accredited and that the
company approves the sale, since the proposed trade nearly always involves
shares subject to transfer restrictions.77 The accredited investor exemption
requires that issuers take reasonable steps to prevent purchasers from
73. See Davidoff, supra note 70. Interestingly, the different disclosure approaches
SharesPost and SecondMarket are taking create a version of Paul Mahoney's suggestion in
The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453, 1458-63 (1997). SecondMarket requires
issuer disclosure, while SharesPost relies on third-party reports. Presumably investors will
favor one venue over the other, and shares of the same firm will trade at a premium or
discount depending on whether investors value the information provided more or less.
74. See Matt Bowman, SharesPost Launches Venture-Backed Index, VATORNEWS (Mar.
3, 2010), http://vator.tv/news/2010-03-03-sharespost-launches-venture-backed-index.
75. Douglas MacMillan & Joshua Gallu, SEC Settles with SharesPost over Private-
Share Trading Probe, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2012-03-14/sec-settles-with-sharespost-after-yearlong-private-share-inquiry.
76. Teitelbaum, supra note 67 ("Weir needles his East Coast rival. 'We come out of a
Silicon Valley mind frame, using technology to solve the problems,' he says. 'They are
brokers with phones."').
77. SecondMarket has a registered broker to verify these details and shepherd the
process along. Id. An "operations specialist" makes sure the transaction complies with
antifraud and money laundering rules. Id. SharesPost requires prospective buyers to submit
their own information certifying their accredited status. A broker then reviews the
information and contacts the customer to confirm that information. If the broker determines
that the prospective buyer qualifies as an accredited investor, then he or she can view or use
the trading platform. They then reconfirm their status at the time of any purchase. See A




20Secondary%20Market%20Securities%2LawO/o203.19.12.pdf; see also Dennis K.
Berman, My Dead Grandma, Facebook Investor, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2011, at Cl. Berman
used his dead grandmother in order to test the site's screening. It worked-for a little while.
SharesPost's primer was posted April 2, 2012. It is unclear what the vetting process was
prior to then, but the new process seems designed to help prevent the "dead grandmother"
problem-which was, as Berman acknowledges, caught rather swiftly by SharesPost. See id.
SecondMarket also must analyze and obtain waivers for any contractual restrictions on share
transfer that may exist.
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selling in violation of the registration requirement.78 Thus, because Rule
144 permits resale only after the seller has held the shares for at least a
year,79 the companies require that sellers demonstrate share ownership for
that period of time. From press accounts, it seems that buyers likewise
agree to restrictions with regard to resale.80
Because the market is private, information about sellers and buyers can
be hard to come by. SecondMarket has released data on the identity of its
sellers for 2011: 79.3 percent of sellers were ex-employees, 11.1 percent
were current employees, 3.7 percent were "investors," 0.4 percent were
founders, and 5.5 percent were "other."81 Darian Ibrahim, author of the
first law article on these markets, conducted interviews with some of the
market participants, and, while acknowledging that most current sellers are
entrepreneurs or employees, he notes that a growing number of venture
capitalists are beginning to sell their shares as well. 82 While companies
themselves may eventually offer shares for sale via these websites,83 they
have not yet done so to any significant degree.
So much for sellers. The next natural question concerns the identity of
the buyers. According to SecondMarket, in 2011, 27.2 percent of its buyers
were individuals; the remaining 72.8 percent were institutional investors (of
which 29 percent were "family offices," an undefined term). 84 Anecdotal
reports indicate that VC funds are buying most of the shares sold on the
secondary market. For example, Elevation Partners is reported to have
invested between $90 and $210 million in Facebook on the secondary
market.85 Even so, a substantial portion have been acquired by wealthy
individuals.
Although accredited status will get an investor in the door, the sites also
require a hefty commitment to make a deal happen. The minimum sales
78. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2012).
79. Id. § 230.144(d)(ii). The holding period is six months for reporting companies under
the Exchange Act. Id. § 230.144(d)(1).
80. Joe Light, Facebook's Early Buyers Burned, Too, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2012, at Cl
("Buyers generally can't unload their shares until Facebook employees are permitted to sell
in November."); see Shayndi Raice et al., Facebook Targets $96 Billion Value, WALL ST. J.,
May 4, 2012, at Al ("Mr. Landis bought shares of Facebook on the secondary market for
$31 to $32 a share over the past year and agreed not to sell the shares for six months after the
IPO.").
8 1. SecondMarket's 2011 Year End Private Company Report, supra note 65.
82. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 16-19.
83. See Jay Yarow, Are We Headed for Disaster with Private Stock Markets? We Talk
to SharesPost CEO David Weir, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/sharespost-interview-2011-3.
84. SecondMarket's 2011 Year End Private Company Report, supra note 65.
85. Michael Arrington, Source: Elevation Partners Got About 1% of Facebook for $90
Million, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 5, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/05/source-elevation-
partners-got-about- 1 -of-facebook-for-90-million/; Dan Primack, supra note 13.
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price for a transaction initiated on SharesPost is $25,000.86 SecondMarket
has a minimum of $100,000 per transaction.87 Other transaction fees can
add up. SecondMarket charges 3 to 5 percent per transaction, split evenly
between buyer and seller.88 SharesPost charges the greater of $5,000 or 5
percent. 89 An opinion from a lawyer stating that the sale qualifies for an
exemption from registration costs around $2,500.90 Buyer and seller each
pay an escrow agent $1,500 to ensure that both shares and money are in
hand and an exchange can occur. Companies may impose separate
minimums of their own; Facebook at one point imposed a minimum
requirement of 10,000 shares for a sale. 91 Companies also may impose
their own additional fees for processing the sales, ranging from $2,500 to
$6,000 dollars per transaction. 92
In summary, accredited status may qualify investors to participate, but
they must commit a sizable amount of money, beginning at around $30,000,
in order to actually invest. Investors may choose between an exchange
offering information from the company (SecondMarket) and one offering
third-party reports (SharesPost). These secondary markets are far removed
from the traditional venture capital world of negotiated face-to-face deals,
engaged investing, and control rights to protect future interests. Buyers
give the sellers money, nothing more.
C Prior Literature on the Secondary Markets
The literature on venture capital is rich and vast.93 In contrast, few legal
scholars have written on the new secondary markets, no doubt in large part
because of their novelty. Darian Ibrahim is optimistic about the
opportunities they hold as a "new exit" for venture capital. Venture capital
funds, as we have seen, seek to return investors' money after a limited time,
86. Frequently Asked Questions for Sellers, SHARESPOST, https://welcome.sharespost
.com/resources-and-insights/faqs/seller-faqs (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) ("Are there any
minimum dollar amounts required for posting?").
87. Oren Livne, Secondary Markets for Private Company Shares: Marketplace
Overview and Predictive Capability 8 (Apr. 2, 2012) (unpublished research paper),
available at http://www.stem.nyu.edu/cons/groups/content/documents/webasset/con 0357
18.pdf Average trade amounts are even higher-about $200,000 on SharesPost and $1
million to $2 million on SecondMarket. Teitelbaum, supra note 67.
88. Teitelbaum, supra note 67.
89. Frequently Asked Questions for Sellers, supra note 86 ("What are the costs of
facilitating a transaction on SharesPost?").
90. Douglas MacMillan, Facebook, Zynga Impose Fees on Private Sales of Shares,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-2 1/linked
in-zynga-may-use-stock-sale-limits-to-curb-pre-ipo-value-inflation.html.
91. Alexia Tsotsis, Facebook Valued at $67.5 Billion in SecondMarket's 10th Auction,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 18, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/02/18/facebook-secondmarket/.
92. MacMillan, supra note 90.
93. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock
and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891 (2002); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1067
(2003); Gilson & Schizer, supra note 46; Sahlman, supra note 38.
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generally ten years. Thus the ability of VC funds to exit, or cash out of
their investments, is of critical importance to their success. Traditional VC
exits took place by means of an IPO or a sale of the portfolio company (a
trade sale). Trade sales may turn a profit for VCs, but Ibrahim characterizes
the IPO as the "gold standard" exit mechanism.94 Yet the IPO is a relative
rarity today.95
Commentators have bemoaned a "liquidity gap" that has arisen as the
domestic IPO market has dried up. 96 Private markets have become
increasingly important as the median age of companies backed by venture
capital at IPO rose to 8.3 years in 2011 from 4.3 years in 1999.97
According to Ibrahim, this liquidity gap poses a problem for the entire
venture capital economy. Most importantly, it creates an illiquidity
discount-investors pay less on the front end for their shares because a
near-term IPO is less likely down the road.98
Ibrahim lauds the prospect of venture capital funds using the secondary
markets as a new exit, filling the liquidity gap. He sees several potential
benefits: First, venture capitalists will pay more for investments if they
know there is a tangible way out, thus reducing the illiquidity discount. 99
Second, the exit will improve corporate governance. 00 In the old regime,
venture capitalists were between a rock and a hard place, locked in an
illiquid investment with no exit right,10' and facing the clamoring of their
own limited partners for a payout from the ten-year fund. Thus, they were
at the mercy of managers who underperform or self-deal.102 In the new
secondary market, they can sell to outside VCs, gaining liquidity for their
own investors and leaving the shares in the hands of investors with a fresh
exit clock.103 So the argument goes that, thus armed with a credible exit
94. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 11-12.
95. See Douglas J. Leary, M&4 Landscape in 2013: Whither the Bottom?, in MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONs LAW 2013: Top LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE
UPCOMING YEAR 55 (2013), available at 2013 WL 574804, at *4.
96. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 11 ("When traditional exit markets are strong, such as the
IPO market of the late 1990s, investor lock-in in venture capital is not severe because IPOs
happen quickly. When traditional exit markets are weak, however, as in recent years,
investor lock-in is severe.").
97. Light, supra note 80.
98. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 14-15.
99. Id. at 22. Ibrahim uses the term "illiquidity premium," but "discount" is the more
accepted term. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 39, at 792.
100. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 24-25.
101. See id. at 6-7; Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock In Lock-In?, 41 TULSA L. REv.
523, 525 (2006).
102. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 7, 24.
103. See id. at 20 ("[D]irect market buyers, themselves funds with investors to answer to,
come into start-ups with a fresh exit clock. Therefore, while the VC's fund may be set to
expire, forcing it to seek even a suboptimal exit, direct market buyers essentially start over in
waiting for a traditional exit. As long as traditional exits for winning companies are simply




power courtesy of the new secondary market, the venture capitalists will be
less vulnerable to agency costs on the part of the entrepreneur. 104
Jose Miguel Mendoza and Erik P.M. Vermeulen have taken a similarly
rosy view of the new secondary markets.105 They too emphasize the need
for liquidity and voice concern that the current dearth of IPOs will
discourage entrepreneurship. 06 They call the new secondary markets an
"essential ingredient" of the new venture capital cycle and argue that
intrusive regulation of them may kill the goose that laid the golden egg.107
They emphasize that "the buyers of shares on these private secondary
marketplaces are not ordinary retail investors, but rather sophisticated
players with prior and detailed knowledge of firms' activities." 08
However, as Part II.B.1 illustrates, Mendoza and Vermeulen overstate their
case. Buyers on SharesPost and SecondMarket are not guaranteed to be
"sophisticated players with prior and detailed knowledge" of the firms they
buy. They are merely guaranteed to be rich.
To date only Elizabeth Pollman has failed to join the chorus rejoicing
over these markets.' 0 9 Pollman worries that information asymmetries may
arise in these markets because buyers and sellers may have vastly different
levels of information and potential conflicts of interest. 110  She is
particularly troubled by the potential for insider trading in the new
markets"ll-a concern I, too, share, but which she has already ably
addressed. 112 In the next section, I turn to more structural challenges these
new markets pose to the traditional VC ecosystem.
D. Concerns
The emergence of the private secondary market constitutes a critical, if
not transformative, development in securities law. I am, however, far more
reluctant than others to hail this innovation as an unadulterated good. Like
Pollman, I worry about information asymmetries and insider trading." 3
But my concerns run much deeper. In this section I raise questions
regarding both the role this market might play as venture capital's "new
exit" and the ramifications of making it easier for accredited investors to
trade in private equity. Stepping even farther back, I consider the challenge
104. Id. at 3.
105. Jose M. Mendoza & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The "New" Venture Capital Cycle (Part
I) The Importance ofPrivate Secondary Market Liquidity (Lex Research Topics in Corporate
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 1/2011, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstractjid=1829835.
106. Id. at 13.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Id. at 22.
109. See Pollman, supra note 66, at 182.
110. Id. at 21-12.
111. Id. at216-21.
112. Id. at 222-35.
113. See Usha Rodrigues, The SharesPost Brief CONGLOMERATE (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/11 /the-sharespost-brief.html.
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these markets might pose to our current securities law regime, regarding
who deserves special access to these kinds of investments-and why.
1. Concerns Regarding the Function of Venture Capital
As a prefatory matter, we should acknowledge that it is unclear to what
extent VCs now do or later will actually make use of the new exit option
Ibrahim, Mendoza, and Vermeulen applaud. Currently, employees and
former employees are the main sellers on SharesPost and SecondMarket. 114
Even so, in 2011, 3.7 percent of SecondMarket's sales were by "investors,"
and this number may grow.115 In short, the existing evidence is thin, but let
us assume that VCs will in fact increasingly make use of this new exit
option. In my view, it is not at all clear that this development would be
good. Indeed, I have four concerns about how this manner of exiting
investment may affect the functioning of our markets and our economy.
First, I am not convinced that there is a "liquidity gap" or, if so, that it is
a problem. It is certainly true that there are fewer IPOs, and perhaps it is
true that acquisitions are second-best exit mechanisms for the VCs.
Ibrahim notes that "when the IPOs of the Internet boom period recently
dropped out of the ten-year measure of VC performance, average returns
plummeted from thirty-four percent to fourteen percent despite a healthy
number of trade sales."116 These numbers do not sound too horrible: a 14
percent return looks pretty good in today's investing climate and is certainly
high enough to attract investors. Moreover, boom-and-bust cycles are
endemic to the industry-the IPO "window" is notoriously short and can
open and close quickly.1 '7 Some suggest that "the lack of an IPO market
has caused venture capitalists to avoid financing some of the more far-
reaching and risky ideas that have no obvious Fortune 500 buyer." 18
To the extent that this quotation indicates that VCs are being more
careful and selective, it is not necessarily a bad thing. In order to view the
114. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
115. See id. Ibrahim cites one observer who stated: "Very recently, however,
entrepreneurs and employees were selling only fifty percent by dollar amount and seventy
percent by transaction volume, meaning that VCs are increasingly turning to secondary sales
for their exit woes." Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 17. Another source stated that "strategic
buyers are also entering the market, but buying 'only what they know."' Id. at 20. A third
source told Ibrahim that "late-stage VCs often buy their preferred shares from early stage
VCs. Id. This interviewee claimed that "sixty to seventy percent of [later-stage VC
financing rounds] have a secondary component to them." Id. In other words, late-stage VCs
buy some of their shares from the start-up's treasury and some from existing investors." Id.
at 19-20.
116. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 12-13.
117. John L. Orcutt, The Case Against Exempting Smaller Reporting Companies from
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: Why Market-Based Solutions Are Likely To Harm Ordinary
Investors, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 325, 383-84 (2009).
118. David Weild & Edward Kim, Why Are IPOs in the ICU?, GRANT THORNTON LLP, 6,
http://www.grantthorton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/files/GT%20Thinking/IPO%2white%2Opa
per/Why%20are%20IPOs%20in%20the%20ICU1_Ll 9.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
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development as a negative, one requires a theory of net societal payoff for
funding super-risky investments. Maybe such a theory exists. My own
sense, however, is that funding such investments may frequently involve
throwing someone's money down the drain. And the someone who turns
out to be at risk may be the very accredited investor through whom the
supposedly beneficial exit option is exercised.
Second, reports of VC's vulnerability vis-d-vis entrepreneurs seem
greatly exaggerated. To begin with, risks of opportunism exist on both
sides, as Ibrahim acknowledges." 9  More importantly, as Part I.A.2
described, VCs carefully screen their investments on the front end and insist
on numerous contractual controls to protect themselves. Of particular
significance, they stage investments, bargain for board representation and
control rights, and secure covenants that give them veto power over major
transactions. 120  Indeed, the generally accepted view is that venture
capitalists are far more likely to put the screws to the entrepreneur, than the
other way around.
Ibrahim advances the idea that VCs are more vulnerable at the beginning
of a start-up's life, when they have fewer seats on the board.121 But this
early stage, when the exit option would be most valuable, is when the
shares will be least liquid on the secondary market. As discussed above, the
new secondary market is generally for mature, late-stage private companies.
A major investor looking to liquidate thousands of shares of an early stage
start-up would flood the market, thus automatically depressing the price.
Moreover, the exploited VC would face a clear lemons problem,122 raising
questions as to the motivation for selling. Buyers may well be reluctant to
invest in companies that experienced VCs are looking to exit. What's
more, SecondMarket's current model gives the company the right to veto
any upcoming sales, thus nullifying any potential investor exit power
(unless they bargain up front for the right to sell-we have yet to see
evidence of such contractual provisions, but they may come). In short, it is
unclear how useful the VC exit option would even be.
Ibrahim is right, however, to point out that in a mature private company
there may be conflicts between what entrepreneurs and investors want-for
example, because of different contractual payouts, perhaps sometimes
founders will favor a trade sale whereas VCs will want to wait for an
IPO.123 Allowing dissenting entrepreneurs or investors to exit via a stock
sale may provide a good way to mitigate these conflicts and bring on board
119. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 25.
120. See generally Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian
Rebuttal to the Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REv. 79, 107,
122 (1997).
121. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 24.
122. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970).
123. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 28-29.
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more like-minded investors. At this point, exit may well be meaningful and
useful, although generally more so to the founders than to VCs.
But even seemingly win-win exits may impose costs, which leads to my
third point: VC illiquidity provides significant benefits. The prospect of
capital lock-in makes investors look before they leap and, once committed,
actively manage and monitor their investment. And the investors who are
locked in are the "smart money"-repeat players with deep knowledge of
the industry and management principles, who pride themselves on being
able to nurture young companies and guide them on the road to success.
Ibrahim concedes that the new secondary market poses a threat to these
"high powered performance incentives": Founders, employees, and
investors alike will be less committed to the organization if they can cash
out. 124 He responds that initial reports indicate that VCs sell only a portion
of their holdings and thus remain motivated to nurture the firm even after
they enter the secondary market.125
Yet the problem seems to remain. VCs are exiting either because they
are unhappy with the company or because outside constraints force them to
liquidate against their druthers. In the former case, the preferred exit would
be a complete one, handicapped in practice by the lemons problem outlined
above. In the latter case, a VC fund that reduced its investment in a firm by
half would presumably (and rationally) proportionately diminish the
attention it paid to that investment. Moreover, the prospect of easy exit
might make it less selective when considering whether to invest in the first
place. Replacing the VC's "smart money" are the faceless investors of the
secondary market. Some of these are highly sophisticated venture
capitalists; others have nothing to recommend them but wealth.
The prospect for muted incentives on the part of employees is likewise
troubling, although more defensible. For example, the new secondary
market gives employees the ability to liquidate a portion of their stock
holdings that would otherwise be illiquid, especially given the seven-to-
eight-year delay they would otherwise experience in the current economy.
Such power would be valuable, especially to those employees who live in
expensive areas such as Silicon Valley, and would not necessarily lessen
their incentive to work hard for the company. The prospect of early sales
may attract better talent, who might otherwise be reluctant to risk tying their
fate to a start-up. Furthermore, Ibrahim observes that most sellers are ex-
employees or forgotten founders whose interests might not align with the
company's any longer.126 Current employees typically sell only some
shares, and they cannot sell at all until a year after their options vest.127
Nevertheless, there are costs as well as benefits to providing employees
with this increase in liquidity. Stock options must be valued at the market
124. Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 30-31.




price, and a board must take into account its company's rising stock price
on the secondary market when assigning a value to options. Rising
secondary market valuations are thus a double-edged sword. While current
employees undoubtedly benefit from being able to cash out a portion of
their stock holdings, prospective employees face the unwelcome prospect of
a richly valued stock grant. When an IPO or a trade sale finally occurs, the
share price may fall below the secondary market price, or the stock option
strike price, as happened with Facebook.128 The result is that employees
who come late to the party may find their stock options "underwater"-i.e.,
worthless. And so they might not accept the invitation of employment at
all.
One might object that, because of transfer restrictions, the company
retains a veto right over proposed sales and would not authorize them if
they conflict with its best interests. Yet the company's decisions are made
by its individual agents, and these agents might have private reasons to
permit or even encourage a secondary market for company shares. Most
notably, they may be looking to cash out their own stock, even if such sales
are detrimental to the firm as a whole.
Fourth, these sales might represent foregone capital for the company. In
a 2011 interview, Barry Silbert, SecondMarket's founder, claimed: "The
money that we are freeing up is being reinvested in other venture-backed
start-ups-and creating jobs . . . . This market we're building is critical to
the whole capital-formation process." 129 Yet any money being "freed up"
is early investor money that may be-but is not necessarily-used to fund
other start-ups. The company receives no money from secondary market
sales, where third parties merely sell shares to one another. All of the gain
goes to early investors and employees. Indeed, these sales could come at
the expense of the company, since demand met on the secondary market
might mean foregone opportunities to raise capital.
On the other hand, secondary markets obviously foster capital markets,
as we see with the national exchanges for public stock. The question is
whether the increase in liquidity the new markets afford outweighs the
potential for cannibalization of the primary market and muting of high-
powered incentives. In other words, the value of the exit option turns on
how many potential VC investors hold back because they fear they will
have to wait too long to exit if IPOs and acquisitions remain the primary
exit mechanisms. In other words, how elastic is the venture capital market?
The question is empirical in nature, and in due course the data may
provide an answer. For now, what is clear is the foregone opportunity:
VCs that buy on the secondary market do not buy in the primary market.
Even if they are investing in both simultaneously, a possibility Ibrahim
suggests, start-up companies may well be missing out on potential
128. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
129. Teitelbaum, supra note 67.
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investment while lessening the commitment of existing investors and
employees because they can exit, or at least know they can exit.
Behind all of these concerns is the sense that the old VC model fostered
private-firm capital raising, but in a constrained manner to individuals who
had specialized knowledge of the industry and the firm. The bargain might
be an implicit one, but it nonetheless existed. The new secondary markets
upset the terms of the deal by letting accredited investors, whose only
qualifications are wealth and the willingness to invest considerable sums,
buy out earlier investors.
2. Concerns Regarding the Accredited Investor Exemption Generally
Thus far I have discussed potential problems that the new secondary
market may pose for the traditional venture capital model. These new
secondary markets are an exciting new development in securities law, and
the preceding section departed from the trend in the nascent literature by
describing some of the costs that they might impose.
But the emergence of this market raises a more far-reaching concern-
that the private and public markets have now grown radically disconnected
and unequal. The American shareholder base has long been large and
diverse, in contrast to the pattern in Europe, where corporations are owned
primarily by banks and wealthy families. 130 While most American
investors own shares through mutual or pension funds, as Professor Zachary
Gubler points out, "underlying these funds are still retail investors:
plumbers, teachers, doctors-people of all stripes who, either through their
retirement plans or their non-retirement savings, invest in these
companies."131 In contrast, the private market, with its promise of outsized
returns, is the exclusive preserve of the accredited investor. We risk
entering-if we have not already entered-an investing world where the
common perception is that the real money is made in the private market.
The JOBS Act's lifting of the prohibition on general advertising for private
investments will only add to the perception of an exclusive market that
exists just for the wealthy.
This perception may not accord with realityl 32: the little-guy investor
may well be better off foreclosed from the private market. But average
investors, despite well-intentioned and sage advice to the contrary, continue
to flock to actively managed funds and otherwise seek to beat the market.
Professor Lynn Stout has recently described what she terms "optimism-
driven speculative trading."1 33  This Article takes no position on the
advisability of such trading, but accepts it as a given: those who participate
130. See Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market,
91 N.C. L. REv. 745 (2013).
131. Id. at 800.
132. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
133. Lynn A. Stout, Uncertainty, Dangerous Optimism, and Speculation: An Inquiry into
Some Limits ofDemocratic Governance, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1177, 1179 (2012).
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in financial markets are inherently, even if wrongly, convinced that they can
or will profit. Such optimists will find less than palatable the notion that the
law keeps them out of certain markets.134
To the extent this perception of being shut-out of a valuable market
exists, we face a major problem. One of the SEC's mantras is that ordinary
investors should enjoy a "level playing field" 35 when investing in the stock
market. Usually this phrase comes up to explain the evils of insider trading
or selective disclosure by companies to analysts, who pass on the
information to favored clients.136 Sometimes the expression surfaces in the
context of flash trading, where investors with supercomputers exploit their
ability to trade faster than the average investor in order to turn a profit. 137
In each case, the harm is to ordinary investors not privy to certain
information or technology that would give them an edge. The harm to the
market, and to the overall economy, from the public perception that public
markets are a tilted playing field is nearly impossible to measure, but it is a
matter of fundamental concern. 138
As difficult to measure, and perhaps just as costly, is the perception that
the stock market is for the schleps too poor to get in on the real action. If
Americans believe that the real profits are being made by the rich, then even
a "level" public stock market would offer only an equal opportunity to earn
a pittance compared with what can be made elsewhere. In other words,
average investors who brave the public markets confront not a stacked deck
but a penny-ante game. The law reserves the high-stakes tables for the
rich. 139
134. Alternatively, investors may seek the basic satisfaction of finding the "next
Microsoft." Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN.
L. REv. 1, 15 (2003). Either way, the fact that current securities law denies them access to a
particular asset class would prove frustrating.
135. Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Happiness, & Trust?, 3 J.
Bus. & TECH. L. 257, 296 (2008).
136. For recent examples, see SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last modified Apr. 1, 2013).
137. See Anish Puaar, No Short Cuts to Level Playing Field in US/EU Markets, TRADE
(Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.thetradenews.com/news/Regions/Americas/No-short-cutsto_
level-playing-fieldinUS/EUmarkets.aspx.
138. The counterargument is that these transactions make market prices more accurate
and the overall market more efficient, to the benefit of all, even the little guy. The truth of
argument and counterargument is irrelevant to my intuition. The point is that a perception
exists that a level playing field is an important regulatory goal. See Jesse M. Fried, Insider
Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455, 456 (2003) ("Although academics still debate the economic
desirability of insider trading, the consensus among the American public, Congress, and the
SEC is that insider trading is 'unfair' and erodes investor confidence in the market.").
139. One objection to this concern is that reports of private equity returns, like Mark
Twain's death, may be greatly exaggerated. See, e.g., Da Rin et al., supra note 53, at 81
("Overall we note that while different studies obtain somewhat different estimates of the net
returns, there is an emerging consensus that average returns of VC funds do not exceed
market returns."). Yet such investments nevertheless offer valuable exposure to a unique
asset class, with a different risk profile, from the typical public equity investment.
Moreover, even if the sector overall does not outperform the market, successful private
equity firms have a tendency to continue to outperform their benchmarks (as mutual funds
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Gubler terms this phenomenon the "crowding out" of the retail investor:
"Thus, as the private securities market expands, the retail investor is
crowded out, and the model of democratic capitalism that has defined the
American corporate landscape for nearly a century is upended." 40 Gubler
points out two costs that stem from the growth of the private market. First,
retail investors are shut out of a whole class of investment and lose out on
the benefit of diversifying into this risky, but profitable, terrain. 141 More is
at stake than not making as much money as the rich, however.
Fundamentally, this disparity in investment opportunity increases the
financial inequality that many analysts criticize. 142 Elizabeth Pollman
voices similar concerns about shutting small investors out of investment in
smaller, growth companies. 143 She quotes finance writer Felix Salmon:
"To invest in younger, smaller companies, you increasingly need to be a
member of the ultra-rich elite."l 44
The Facebook IPO raises an alternate, less troubling possibility-that
investing in hot private companies may be a mark of cachet rather than an
investing strategy.145 Felix Salmon raises this scenario, where investing in
private companies is yet another means of conspicuous consumption:
In reality, however, it's increasingly looking as though shares in
private tech companies are a bit like fine art prices: a place for the rich to
spend lots of money and feel great about owning something very few
other people can have. The minute they become public and democratic,
they lose their cachet. And a lot of their value. 146
If buying these companies is the equivalent of owning a Rolls-Royce or a
Birkin bag, perhaps the secondary market is no big deal-although it is
worth noting that even a janitor or police officer with a few thousand
dollars to spend can buy a Birkin bag. There is no minimum net worth
required for purchase. In contrast, the government forbids them from
buying private shares.
do not). Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 172, 188.
Finally, reassurances that venture capital returns are not desirable may ring hollow to
investors shut out by law from such investments.
140. Gubler, supra note 130, at 800-01.
141. See id.
142. See TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA'S GROWING INEQUALITY
CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 177-78 (2012) ("[A]mong the half of all Americans
who are in the market, only about one third have stock holdings worth $7,000 or more....
Eighty-one percent of all stocks are owned by the top 10 percent; 69 percent by the top 5
percent; and 38 percent by the top 1 percent.").
143. Pollman, supra note 66, at 239-40.
144. Id. at 239 (quoting Felix Salmon, Op-Ed., Wall Street's Dead End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2011, at A27).
145. See Light, supra note 80 ("Scoring early shares of Facebook carried a measure of
cachet.").




There is one unalloyed benefit to these secondary markets: they have
generated greater efficiency and transparency. Secondary markets in
private equity have existed for years, but they have been ad hoc and largely
accidental.147 It was hard for interested buyers to find willing sellers, and
vice versa. 148 Furthermore, each buyer had to conduct her own due
diligence, without the benefit of information on prior sales or any
semblance of a market price.149 Each individual transaction might entail a
great deal of negotiation.150 While perhaps not as efficient as the public
market, the new secondary private market makes buying and selling these
kinds of shares more feasible for more people with greater information and
lower transaction costs.
Perhaps just as importantly, the new secondary markets moved these
deals out of backrooms and into the light of the internet.15' No longer is
getting in on the "ground floor" of the next hot company a function of
whom you hang with in Silicon Valley. In this sense, the new secondary
markets do level the private market playing field. Yet the field has been
leveled only for the small minority of investors-namely, accredited
investors-who are permitted to play under the rules of the game. In short,
the playing field may be more level than it used to be for the haves. The
have-nots, however, are still shut out. And they are shut out in a starker and
more visible way than ever before.
Transparency is synonymous with virtue in the modern age, so it seems
downright perverse to describe it as problematic. Yet the secondary
markets do more than give their participants a clearer sense of how
individual companies are valued and lower their transaction costs when
investing. They also provide a newfound visibility into the division of the
investing world into haves and have-nots. Average Joes already know they
cannot invest in hedge funds, VC funds, and private equity funds. But the
means of making such investments and the criteria the funds employ to
screen potential investors is mysterious. In contrast, to use SharesPost or
SecondMarket all you need is an internet connection-and enough money.
147. See Light, supra note 80 ("Secondary markets have existed for years, with behind-
the-scenes brokers hooking up buyers and sellers. [SharesPost/SecondMarket] attempts to
provide more transparency to private transactions and a more uniform process of buying and
selling.").
148. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 21.
149. See id.
150. Id. ("[S]ubstantial negotiation might ensue over the purchase price and other
transaction details.").
151. Gennine Kelly, Private Exchanges in 'Dialogue' With SEC: President SharesPost,
CNBC (Dec. 29, 2010, 3:20 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40842540/PrivateExchanges
inDialogueWith .SEC_PresidentSharesPost ("Essentially what we've done is taken all
those same securities laws that have always protected investors buying private company
securities and we just wired them into a web interface-a 2.0 type platform that allows a
certain amount of efficiently [sic], transparency and scale to what used to be a very
backroom industry where private companies shares would trade." (quoting Greg Brogger,
President of SharesPost) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Couple that with the possibility of private investment opportunities being
advertised to a general public that cannot meet the requirements to buy
them,152 and what emerges is a much clearer window into the private
investing world than the public has ever known before.
The new transparency may not be problematic at all, if you believe that
we should no longer sweep securities law's dirty little secret of differential
investor treatment under the rug. At the very least, it may be time to
reassess the balance we have struck between investor protection, capital
formation, and equality of access.
II. DISPARITY IN INVESTMENT ACCESS TODAY
This part attempts to work a species of Copernican revolution in
securities law by examining the question of securities sales from the buyer's
perspective. A brief history of the accredited investor exemption reveals
the basic problem: securities regulation regulates the offerings that firms
make to the public. By creating a "private offering" exception, where the
only rule is not to commit fraud, and by further allowing one aspect of the
exception to turn on the qualities of the buyer, the law set the stage for
differential investor treatment. So much for the doctrine. In terms of
theory, scholars have focused on justifying the imposition of mandatory
disclosure on public firms; relatively few have grappled in any systematic
way with the existence of private offerings, let alone justified them. What
results is a gap in our understanding of how securities law works in
practice. In the name of investor protection, investors have been harmed by
being sidelined. After laying this groundwork, this part describes the harm
the general public suffers when shut out of the private markets, and
proposes a relatively easy fix: private market mutual fund-like investments.
It offers a public choice explanation for the failure of such a market to arise
to date, and closes with the suggestion that perhaps the advent of the new
secondary markets might spur change. Private market mutual funds could
replicate some of the beneficial monitoring venture capital used to provide.
A. How We Got Here: A Short History of the
Accredited Investor Exemption
The new secondary markets hinge on the accredited investor concept-
that wealth alone can serve as a safe harbor against the buffeting winds of
the private market. The accredited investor exemption is a relatively new
idea, the product of decades of struggle to determine who should fall
outside the reach of the securities laws. The original 1933 Securities Act
distinguished two different types of securities offerings: public and
nonpublic. Public offerings had to be registered with the Commission and
meet imposed disclosure rules that have only grown more elaborate over
152. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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time. In contrast, transactions "not involving any public offering" 53 (i.e.,
private offerings) were exempt from registration, on the theory that "there is
no practical need for [the Security Act's] application or . . . the public
benefits are too remote."154
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the Supreme Court first articulated how to
identify those who have no practical need for the Security Act's
protection.155 The Court held that "[a]n offering to those who are shown to
be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public
offering."" 56 Exemption, according to the Court, turned on the lack of
"knowledge of the offerees," including "the need of the offerees for the
protections afforded by registration." 5 7 The Court further hinted that to
negate disclosure duties, offerees would need "to have access to the kind of
information which registration would disclose."' 58  While seemingly
straightforward, Ralston Purina raised questions of application: When are
investors able to fend for themselves? What should courts look to in
making this determination? How important is the investor's overarching
"knowledge" of the securities market as opposed to having access to
company-specific information?
Issuers, the SEC, and the judiciary all struggled for decades with the
inherent subjectivity of trying to determine what makes investors able to
"fend for themselves." For example, Rule 146 focused on whether an
investor "could afford to hold unregistered securities for an indefinite
period, and whether, at the time of the investment, he could afford a
complete loss." 59 There were three requirements: (1) that an issuer have
"reasonable grounds to believe that each offeree was a sophisticated
investor," with wealth or specialized knowledge tending to demonstrate that
sophistication, (2) that the issuer have "reasonable grounds to believe that a
purchaser either could evaluate the investment's risks and merits himself,
or had consulted a financial advisor and was able to bear the financial
risks," and (3) that each offeree needed to have "access to the same kind of
information that a registration statement would have provided."l 60 As
Professor C. Edward Fletcher observed, "Rule 146 thus required that all
153. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
154. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. 2, at 5 (1933). Section 4(1) of the Securities Act
accordingly exempts from registration "transactions by any person other than an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer" and "not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l)-(2).
155. 346 U.S. 119, 126-27 (1953).
156. Id. at 125.
157. Id. at 125-27.
158. Id. at 127.
159. Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933-"Transactions by
an Issuer Deemed Not To Involve Any Public Offering," Securities Act Release No. 33-5487
(1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261, 15,264 (May 2, 1974).
160. C. Edward Fletcher III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws,
1988 DuKE L.J. 1081, 1122-23.
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offerees be sophisticated or wealthy, [and] that actual purchasers be
sophisticated or consult a financial advisor."'61
The SEC switched gears in 1982. Its new Regulation D moved from a
regime that required both access to information and sophistication to one
that required investors to have access to information and "either
sophistication or wealth." 62 The "sophistication" requirement hewed to
the spirit of past exemption law and regulation. Sophisticated purchasers
(limited to no more than thirty-five per company) must have, either on their
own merits or by way of an intermediary (termed the purchaser
representative), "such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that [they are] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment." 63 While the sophistication test may still sound
subjective, Rule 508 (enacted a few years later) creates a safe harbor for
issuers as long as the offering was made in good faith.164
But Regulation D's real innovation came with its grant of a special status
to the "accredited investor," who was qualified to participate in private
offerings by virtue of wealth alone. 165 This development set the stage for
the formation of today's secondary market. Congress, as part of the Small
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, first introduced the idea of the
accredited investor, defined as "any person who, on the basis of such factors
as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in
financial matters, or amount of assets under management qualifies as an
accredited investor under rules and regulations which the Commission shall
prescribe." 66 Drawing on this new delegation of authority, the SEC in
1982 promulgated Rule 501, which defined accredited investors to include
natural persons with a net worth of $1,000,000 or income over $200,000
over each of the last two years, with a reasonable expectation of the same in
the current year.167 For the first time an investor could participate in private
offerings simply because of high income or net worth. 168
161. Id. at 1123.
162. Id. (emphasis added). Rule 242 replaced Rule 146 for a matter of two years but was
largely an interim step on the road to Regulation D, so this brief history of the accredited
investor will not describe it.
163. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (2012) (requiring that a "good faith and reasonable attempt
was made to comply with all applicable terms, conditions and requirements" of the relevant
exemption).
165. Although there are eight categories of accredited investors, this Article will focus on
natural persons because my interest lies in the perceptions of inequality between ordinary
(natural person) investors and their more wealthy counterparts.
166. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 603, 94
Stat. 2275, 2294 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).
167. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (1982).
168. As an interesting historical aside, the original Regulation D as promulgated in 1980
included a "heavy hitter" or "big ticket" qualification for accredited investor status. If
investors purchased at least $150,000 worth of the security being offered, they could qualify
as accredited investors. In 1988, the SEC eliminated this path to accredited investor status.
See Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics
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The accredited investor exemption has remained in place ever since. The
SEC expanded the definition to take account of spousal earnings in 1988,
providing that joint income of over $300,000 for the past two years, with a
reasonable expectation of the same in the current year, would qualify either
spouse as an accredited investor. 169 On the other hand, the SEC in 2010
effectively raised the net worth requirement-in keeping with new limits
imposed by Dodd-Frank-by excluding the value of an investor's primary
residence and calculating as a liability any mortgage indebtedness to the
extent that the home is "underwater."o7 0 This reform responded to the
concern that "one million dollars isn't what it used to be"-an idea to which
I will return later.
That, in a nutshell, is the story of the accredited investor exemption. I,
for one, do not see in this history a sinister plot to favor the wealthy and
keep the rest of us in our place. Rather, the accredited investor appears to
be the natural outgrowth of a focus on the different risks that private
companies pose to different categories of investors. Our securities laws ban
private firms from the public markets. From the beginning, however, we
begrudgingly allowed these private companies access to a subset of
investors for whom "there is no practical need" for protection. Regulators
and judges struggled over the years to articulate how best to define and
describe that subset, moving from individuals who can "fend for
themselves" or have "knowledge" and "access" to registration-like
information (Ralston Purina), to "sophisticated investors" with access to
the same kind of information registration would provide (Rule 146).
In 1982, the SEC introduced its new bright-line rule for defining
accredited investors. Issuers no longer needed to make subjective
assessments of the sophistication of a potential investor. If investors had a
high enough net worth or yearly income, then they were eligible for the
broad swath of investment opportunities denied the retail investor. While
ofRegulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 277 (1990). Still, its original inclusion may be
significant as we consider what kinds of investors should enjoy access to private companies.
If a sizable investment makes for salutary monitoring, perhaps the willingness to plunk down
a large sum should once more grant investing hopefuls access to private companies.
169. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (1988).
170. That is, to the extent that the mortgage exceeds the estimated fair market value of
that residence. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 413(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l 1) (Supp. V. 2011). Section 413(b) of Dodd-Frank also directed the SEC
to regularly review the accredited investor definition. Id. § 77b(b). An early version of
Dodd-Frank, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, initially proposed
raising the limit to $2.3 million in net worth or $450,000 in income. See Michael L. Monson,
The Evolution and Future of the Accredited Investor Standard for Individuals, 23 UTAH B.J.,
no. 6, 2010, at 36, 38; see also Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217,
111th Cong. § 412 (2010); Seth Chertok, A Detailed Analysis of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 1, 38 (2011). After
substantial opposition, the Senate version of the Stability Act was only amended to no longer
allow individuals to include their primary residence in their wealth calculations, but leave the
income and wealth thresholds otherwise untouched.
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wormholes remained for the average investor,171 because of their risks,
issuers have used them sparingly.172
None of this involved a conspiracy to keep the average Joe out of the
private market. Instead, the law reflected an ongoing regulatory effort to
strike a policy-sensitive balance, coupled with the emergence over time of a
wealth-based bright-line rule. This evolution from standards to rules
comported with themes that permeate our law. While standards offer the
advantage of nuance, they also carry inevitable difficulties in application.
Bright-line rules offer ease in application but may be underinclusive,
overinclusive, or both. The choice between standards and rules thus
involves tradeoffs that are well documented in the legal literature.' 7 3
171. For example, under Rule 504 an issuer can sell up to $1 million in securities in a
twelve-month period to unaccredited investors as long as it delivers disclosure documents
that comply with the requirements of the state in which the security is registered, and
delivers those documents to all purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2012). Rule 505
allows issuers to sell up to $5 million in securities in a twelve-month period to up to thirty-
five unaccredited investors, as long as (1) purchasers are informed that they will receive
restricted securities that cannot be sold for six months or longer without registration,
(2) nonaccredited investors receive disclosure documents equivalent to those used in
registered offerings, and (3) an independent public accountant certifies the issuer's financial
statements. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (general requirements for offerings up to $5 million);
id. § 230.502(b)(l)-(2) (describing the type of information that must be furnished to
unaccredited investors under Rules 505 and 506); id. § 230.502(b)(2) (noting that issuers that
do not have to file Form 10-K must have their financial statements audited and that issuers
that do have to file Form 10-K must provide one of their annual reports, information on form
10-K, or information on form S-I to investors); id. § 230.502(b)(2)(vii) (requiring that issuer
advise all purchasers of resale restrictions). Rule 506 imposes no dollar cap and permits up
to thirty-five unaccredited investors. However, it requires that (1) all nonaccredited
investors have sufficient financial and business sophistication to be able to evaluate the
merits and risks of the prospective investments, (2) the nonaccredited investors receive
disclosure documents equivalent to those used in registered offerings, (3) purchasers be
informed that they are receiving restricted securities, and (4) an independent public
accountant certifies the issuer's financial statements. Id. § 230.506(b)(2) (allowing no more
than thirty-five unaccredited investors, and requiring that all unaccredited investors be
sophisticated); id. § 230.502(b)(l)-(2) (describing the type of information that must be
furnished to unaccredited investors under Rules 505 and 506); id. § 230.502(b)(2)(vii)
(requiring that the issuer advise all purchasers of resale restrictions). None of these
exemptions permit general solicitation or advertisement. Regulation A also permits
offerings to unaccredited investors but is rarely used. Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation
A: Small Businesses' Search for "A Moderate Capital," 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 82-83
(2006).
172. Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 681, 690
(2000) (suggesting that hedge funds rarely solicit unaccredited investors); Henry Ordower,
Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 323, 335 (2007)
(suggesting that since the wealth requirements for accredited investor status are relatively
modest, unaccredited investors are not attractive to issuers); Wallis K. Finger, Note,
Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC's "Accredited Investor" Definition Under
the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 733, 745, 766 (2009) (noting that hedge funds rarely
issue securities to unaccredited investors because the cost outweighs the revenue gained).
173. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1685 (1976); Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and
Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 823 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards,
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Although not driven by malicious intent, this regulatory evolution had the
effect of creating a world divided into investing haves and have-nots.174 To
date most critiques of the accredited investor concept have focused on the
vulnerability of the haves, questioning their sophistication and ability to
truly "fend for themselves."1 75 My concerns about this body of law lie
mostly elsewhere, but a quick review of the standard criticisms reveals both
the extent of the danger these scholars have highlighted and the extent to
which securities literature has ignored the sidelining of the retail investor.
Perhaps this omission is unsurprising. U.S. securities law starts from the
premise that private corporations pose serious risks. As a result, the
average investor must be protected from them. As the next section reveals,
with two exceptions, no one questions the baseline premise.
B. Securities Literature
The securities law literature has almost completely ignored the problem
of differential investing the accredited investor exemption created. This
section first describes scholarly treatments of the accredited investor
exemption, which have mostly argued that the threshold is too low. It next
moves to examine the reasons behind scholars' failure to address the
problem of differential investor access.
1. Criticism of the Accredited Investor Concept
The SEC's equation of wealth and sophistication has attracted much
attention and much objection. The difficulty is that the SEC's new
definition of favored investors is both under- and overinclusive with respect
to the underlying purposes of federal securities law. First, the definition
omits many individuals who in fact do have the financial sophistication and
knowledge to weigh the risks and fend for themselves. However, while a
few commentators acknowledge in passing the underinclusiveness problem,
they have spilled more ink on the overinclusiveness problem. Rich, they
say, does not mean sophisticated. Or even smart. For years commentators
have pointed out the risks private placements pose to the "rich, accredited,
33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-
Foreword, The Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992).
174. Roberta Karmel ably described the incoherencies in the SEC's definition and
treatment of accredited investors. Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The
Changing Definition of an Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 686-91 (2008).
175. See, e.g., Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes "The Myth of the
Sophisticated Investor," 40 U. BALT. L. REv. 215, 253 (2010) ("What the Madoff fraud
seemingly exposed was an astonishing lack of critical diligence by numerous sophisticated
investors. Given the vast sums invested with Madoff, these investors had every incentive-
and the means-to look after their own interests.... Nonetheless, a number of them seemed
unable or unwilling to fend for themselves." (citations omitted)).
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undiversified" investor. 176 Professor Manning Gilbert Warren observed in
1984:
Experience indicates that the wealthy often do not have the sophistication
to demand access to material information or otherwise to evaluate the
merits and risks of a prospective investment. Consequently, they
frequently fail to seek professional advice, particularly if they are
focusing on the immediate tax consequences of an investment.
Furthermore, the net worth, income, and amount of purchase criteria do
not assure that, in fact, the investor is able to bear the risk of losing the
invested funds. For example, an investor accredited solely by virtue of
net worth may base his net worth computation on liberally appraised
illiquid assets or on the assets of a spouse. An investor accredited solely
by income . .. may actually be insolvent at the time of purchase.177
Professor C. Edward Fletcher likewise observes that "the SEC assumes
either that wealthy investors are always sophisticated or that they, no matter
how naive, do not need the protection of the 1933 Act's registration
provisions."1 78
Professors Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson have pointed out
that "we have plenty of anecdotal evidence of institutional and wealthy
individual investors fending for themselves poorly." 79 Professor Howard
Friedman argued that the rich, accredited, and undiversified are vulnerable
and poorly protected by the securities laws.'80 Professor Felicia Smith
described the "myth of the sophisticated investor," as revealed by Bernard
Madoff s Ponzi scheme. 18 1 Madoff operated a hedge fund, and accordingly
his investors were (or were supposed to be) accredited investors. 182 But
being accredited investors did not save them from financial disaster. And it
is not just Bernie Madoff. Professor Jennifer Johnson points out that
"[m]ost promoters involved in these questionable investment schemes sell
176. Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae
in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 291, 291 (1994). Larger private
placements are available under Rule 144A to "qualified institutional buyers"; that is, any
entity of the following types that owns and discretionarily invests, whether for its own
account or the accounts of other qualified institutional investors, in the aggregate at least
$100 million in securities unaffiliated with the entity: insurance companies, registered
investment companies, licensed small business investment companies, state and local
employee benefit plans, ERISA plans, certain trust funds, business development companies,
nonprofit companies, corporations (other than banks), partnerships, business trusts, and
registered investment advisors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(i)(A)-I) (2012). Because more
than accredited investor status is needed to invest in such offerings, they are outside the
scope of this Article.
177. Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption
Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 355, 382
(1984).
178. Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1124.
179. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 362 (2013).
180. See Friedman, supra note 176.
181. Smith, supra note 175, at 215.
182. Id. at 233; see also Pierre-Louis, supra note 20, at 46.
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securities pursuant to the so-called private placement exemption of the
federal securities law, which is only available for sales to [accredited]
investors."183
In the end, however, these perennial criticisms of the accredited investor
have failed to gain traction. Protecting the haves--even the victims of
Bernie Madoff-just does not play well in the media or in the legislature.
Langevoort and Thompson offer a practical and plausible justification: "in
a world of thin regulatory resources, larger and relatively more
sophisticated investors are lower priority" because they have larger, more
diversified portfolios and, if all else fails, the wherewithal to sue. 1 8 4 Even if
they cannot fend for themselves, they can afford to lose the money:
The ability to absorb losses may actually be the real explanation for what
we mean by investors who do not need the protection of the securities
laws-they can and do suffer from issuer concealment, but rarely
drastically. As such, they can more easily be told simply to learn from the
experience, not repeat the mistake, and seek damages if fraud can be
proven. 185
The SEC has not been entirely blind to the risks posed to the
unsophisticated accredited investor and, indeed, it made a regulatory push
in 2007 to raise the threshold for qualifying as an accredited investor. In
doing so, it noted that the driving force behind the original definition in
1982 was "ensuring that only such persons who are capable of evaluating
the merits and risks of an investment in private offerings may invest in
one."1 86 The Commission further noted that, between inflation and the
rapid increase in housing values, "many individual investors today may be
eligible to make investments . .. that previously may not have qualified."187
The SEC floated two separate reforms aimed at raising the threshold, but
both failed to take hold.188
183. Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 151,152 (2010).
184. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 179, at 363.
185. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1064 (2009).
186. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisors to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited
Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 8766, 72 Fed.
Reg. 400, 404 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007).
187. Id.
188. First, the SEC proposed a new "large accredited investor" standard that would apply
to hedge funds. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act
Release No. 8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116, 45,119 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007). Individuals
would need $2.5 million in investments (as opposed to net worth) or an annual income of
$400,000 (or $600,000 with one's spouse) to qualify as large accredited investors. Id.
Second, it proposed an alternative "investments-owned" standard, under which $750,000 in
investments would qualify a person as accredited investor, apart from separate qualifying
tests based on net worth and annual income. Id. at 45,123-24. The SEC also proposed
indexing all investment thresholds for inflation, by tying all dollar-amount thresholds to an
index of publicly available price data from the Department of Commerce, with such changes
to first be made on July 1, 2012. Id. at 45,126. These proposed changes went nowhere,
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On the other side of the equation, hardly any scholars have criticized the
accredited investor concept as being underinclusive. Indeed, I have come
across only two commentators who have even suggested that there might be
a problem, and both focus solely on the area of hedge funds. Jasmin Sethi
proposes a new role for securities regulation-expanding investor
opportunity.189 She argues that, as in the areas of housing, education, and
civil rights, it may be appropriate for the government to intervene in
financial regulation in order to expand the opportunities of unaccredited
investors. 190 While making intriguing points, Sethi grounds her argument
in empirical research on investor behavior and limits her focus to access to
hedge funds. Furthermore, she was serving as an SEC attorney at the time
of the article's publication-not in the mainstream of the legal academy. In
contrast, Houman B. Shadab is a professor at New York Law School. In
2008, he offered a similar argument for granting retail investors the access
to hedge fund investment, 191 based on the harm caused by not having a
fully diversified portfolio. Thus, while both articles buck the prevailing
trend and argue for expanding investor access, neither ventures beyond the
realm of hedge funds to ask broader questions about what should define the
contours of the private market.
Given the lack of criticism of the status quo, perhaps it is unsurprising
that scholars have not felt the need to justify accredited investors' special
status in any detail. As described above, some scholars defend the current
system against charges of overinclusiveness by arguing that, even if wealth
is a weak proxy for sophistication, at least accredited investors (if
diversified) can bear the loss. But I have been unable to find a justification
of the accredited investor exemption that might placate an unaccredited
investor aggrieved at being sidelined.
2. Glossing over the Public/Private Divide in the Scholarship
In some sense, it is puzzling that legal scholars have largely ignored the
"dirty little secret" of the different rules that apply for the private market.
From another perspective, it is not surprising at all. As the prior section has
shown, securities law doctrine has always focused on the firm-the seller-
rather than the buyer (except in the context of investor protection). The
literature has likewise focused on firms rather than investors. 19 2 The classic
presumably because the fallout from the financial crisis diverted SEC attention to other,
more pressing matters.
189. Jasmin Sethi, Another Role for Securities Regulation: Expanding Investor
Opportunity, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 783, 796-97 (2011).
190. Id. at 793.
191. Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market
for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 251, 269-70 (2008).
192. The most notable exception is a proposal by Stephen Choi that advocates moving to
regulate investors rather than issuers. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A
Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 279, 310 (2000). However, Choi advocates
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justifications for mandatory federal securities regulation turn on the
desirability of requiring firms to disseminate knowledge; they do not by
their terms allow for a class of investors that somehow would not benefit
from such knowledge. In other words, they largely ignore the existence of
private markets entirely. The divide between public and private markets is
therefore remarkably undertheorized, although Donald Langevoort is a
notable exception.193 His recent work with Robert Thompson has explored
the limits of "publicness" in today's markets.194
The private markets are private because the companies may sell their
shares without submitting to initial registration with the SEC under the
Securities Act and continual reporting under the Exchange Act. The
traditional economic justifications for mandatory registration and disclosure
are that with unregulated markets: (1) investors are not sufficiently
protected from stock price manipulation and fraud; (2) information is
underproduced unless universally required because it is a public good (a
variant being that it is naturally underproduced because, although firms
would ideally disclose information that investors want, they abstain because
they know competitors will profit from any secrets they reveal);19 5 and
(3) the danger lurks that managers will self-deal with the corporation to
enrich themselves at the corporation's expense-palm off corporate shares
on unsuspecting investors and then make a quick getaway.196
The problem with these arguments is that they apply just as easily to the
private market as the public one-indeed, they apply to any market in
which there is significant trading. If information on companies being
traded is a valuable public good, why not have all companies register their
shares and issue periodic reports? If agency problems are a concern, why
not have all companies disclose related-party transactions? But we have
made a different regulatory choice; instead, mandatory disclosure
requirements apply to the public markets alone. Federal regulation of the
private market is limited to the antifraud Rule I Ob-5.1 97 The existence of a
private market where disclosure rules do not apply must indicate that,
despite the economic justifications above, the costs of mandatory disclosure
are only justifiably imposed when certain other conditions exist.198
One logical way to draw the line is to mandate that firms go public when
the number of investors is so great that the benefits of mandatory disclosure
formally creating a hierarchy of investors, limiting unsophisticated investors' options even
further than the current regime.
193. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 179.
194. Id.
195. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2367 (1998).
196. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure As a Solution to Agency Problems,
62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1080 (1995).
197. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
198. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 991 n.65.
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outweigh its costs. In other words, an easy delineation between public and
private might be that, once a company's stock has more than a certain
number of investors, then to avoid costly duplication of investigation and
negotiation on the part of each individual investor, disclosure should be
mandatory. Yet a mixture of congressional and agency actions makes
reliance on mere number of investors impractical.199
A better approach might be to consider the difference between public and
private transactions as hinging on whether the market is primary or
secondary. The secondary market is where the payoff for issuer disclosure
really emerges. Easterbrook and Fischel point out that initial investors can
easily bargain for certification, information, covenants, etc. 200 (At a certain
point the numbers make individual bargaining inefficient, but leave that to
one side.) In the secondary market such bargains prove much more
difficult, particularly after the initial resale. Even the first buyer of a resale
transaction is no longer in privity with the issuer.201 Buyers two or three
steps downstream, if they are to exist, must rely on disclosure; and for these
buyers mandatory disclosure is better than voluntary disclosure for the
traditional reasons described above: information is a public good, is costly
to coordinate, and will increase social welfare-at the point where a
secondary market exists.
Note that whether the private market buyers can "fend for themselves" is
conspicuously absent from this analysis, just as it plays no role in traditional
law and economics justifications of mandatory disclosure. The traditional
justifications for mandatory disclosure-efficiency in scale and the utility
of the public good of information-are indifferent to the buyer's
sophistication. Yet current law nevertheless discriminates on the basis of
wealth, as a proxy for sophistication, or the ability to fend for oneself.
Securities law thus in theory, as in practice, marginalizes the average
investor without acknowledging that it does so, let alone justifying it.
C. The Problem with Sidelining the Little Guy
The SEC's legislative charges are to protect investors and to promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. Limiting the general public
from investing in risky private offerings may well serve the ends of both
199. Although section 12(g) of the Exchange Act provides that companies with over 500
shareholders of record are subject to many of its disclosure requirements (and conventional
wisdom has it that this requirement explains why Google and Facebook went public), the
SEC counts shareholders "of record" narrowly. Langevoort, supra note 185, at 1068-69.
Section 501 of the JOBS Act increased the record-holder threshold from 500 persons to
2,000 persons or 500 persons who are unaccredited investors. Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012).
200. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV 669, 682-83 (1984).
201. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 179, at 363.
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capital formation and investor protection.202 Giving only wealthy and
sophisticated investors special chances for big gains, after all, may help
move capital into the hands of cash-hungry young companies, while
protecting those investors who can least afford the risks that attend opaque
and illiquid investments.
Make no mistake, these markets are risky. Illiquid and opaque, they
represent the opposite of a guaranteed payout-indeed, they offer the
chance of losing everything just as much as a chance at high returns. For
me, at least, the risks of allowing retail investors to participate directly in
this market-particularly given the substantial commitments involved-
would be too great. Even if it were possible for the average investor to
scrape together the minimum $30,000 needed for an investment on
SharesPost, for example, relying so heavily on the performance of one
company is a recipe for investment disaster.
Yet there is a real harm in shutting average investors completely out of
this market. As Professor Houman B. Shadab puts it, "Modern finance has
one overriding lesson: investors can minimize risk by placing their capital
into a diverse portfolio of securities from numerous different issuers and
different types of assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, commodities, real estate,
etc.)." 203 While risky assets such as private company stock should not play
a large role in the average investor's portfolio, they have their place for two
reasons. First, greater risk should carry with it greater returns.204 Second,
diversification of assets reduces risk to the extent that the performance of
those assets does not correlate. 205 In other words, if various asset classes do
not move in tandem, gains in one area should help to offset losses in
another. Investors who are underdiversified risk missing out on gains,
particularly in areas like the private markets, where high return should
accompany the high risk they represent.206
Moreover, government intervention in this particular market seems
unjustifiable for a number of reasons. Focusing on the risks that stocks
pose is somewhat inexplicable, given that individuals are free to lose their
shirts in a variety of ways. People can purchase cars or homes they cannot
afford, or gamble away their savings in a casino or on lottery tickets, all
without government interference. While it is true that the market might
price some buyers out of certain mortgages or car loans, having a market
202. See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 445, 506 (2011). But see Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The
Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (asserting that the
primary role of U.S. securities regulation is creating a competitive market for information
traders).
203. Shadab, supra note 191, at 267.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Janet Kiholm Smith et al., The SEC's "Fair Value" Standard for Mutual Fund
Investment in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
421,471 (2001).
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judge that people cannot afford to buy an item is quite different from the
government prohibiting them from purchasing it as a matter of law.207
Secondly, underdiversification-shutting out retail investors from a
particular asset class-is a real danger.
More broadly, the merits of private equity funds have been a recurrent
topic of our national conversation-particularly in light of recent
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney's role in Bain Capital, a
private equity firm. The discussion has often focused on whether private
equity funds are "good" or "bad," job creators or job destroyers. The
standard economists' answer is that investors should be indifferent. In the
case of hostile acquisitions that profit the acquirer at the expense of the
target, for example, fully diversified investors will gain as much from
owning acquirers as they lose from owning targets. But in the case of
private equity, average investors are net losers-not because they fail to
achieve the lofty summits of the private equity manager's "two and twenty"
compensation; rather, because of government regulation they cannot
participate in the profits that private equity funds make, while nevertheless
must share in the losses.
One logical rejoinder is that private equity returns are not what they are
cracked up to be. Given the inherently private nature of these investments,
pinning down their profitability has proven difficult. While there are
reports of impressively high profits, 208 there are also reports of below-
market returns. 209 The answer to such a critique is simple: accept, for the
sake of argument, that the average investor should simply buy and hold a
diversified array of publicly available assets. Take as a given that following
such an investment philosophy is rational and will maximize individual
returns.
Most investors do not. Stocks trade today with a frequency far in excess
of what one would expect if investors were buying and holding, selling only
to pay for long-term goals like college tuition or retirement. 210 Professor
Stout attributes this behavior to an irrational optimism-driven speculation.
Professors Choi and Pritchard describe it as a preference for gambling, at
least in the respectable arena of the stock market. 211  Whatever the
motivation, the desire to beat the market appears to be a fundamental
feature of investor behavior. Accepting that impulse as a given, the
question becomes how to deal with the problem of differential access.
207. Securities, as intangible assets, may be more susceptible to fraud than cars or houses.
In Part II.D, I discuss a solution that could alleviate the fraud concern while not shutting
average investors out of an entire asset class.
208. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 52, at 261.
209. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
210. See Stout, supra note 133, at 1184.
211. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 134, at 15.
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D. The Answer: Secondary Market Funds
We can let the "little guy" have the same opportunities as the accredited
investor, if we want to. A few scholars support this approach; for example,
recently Professor Gubler argued that retail investors should not be
"crowded out" of the private market.2 12 Presently, virtually no mutual
funds invest in the secondary market, largely because complying with
current valuation requirements makes the creation of such investment pools
impractical. 213 Interestingly, in 1968, right before the enactment of such
regulations, mutual funds accounted for 29 percent of institutional
investment in illiquid equities such as restricted shares, venture capital, and
private equity investments. 214 Investment in a secondary market mutual
fund or closed-end fund would allow the retail investor to participate in this
new market while maintaining the ability to diversify by investing in a
number of companies.
As a preliminary matter, I dismiss out of hand the possibility of removing
the qualification of accredited investor status in order to gain direct entry
into these sites. I believe, admittedly paternalistically, that the average
investor should not commit a sizable amount of his or her fortune to one or
two companies' stock-whether private or public. Indeed, modem
portfolio theory teaches that diversification yields the surest return. 215 The
wise investor will invest some money in real estate, large domestic publicly
traded companies, small publicly traded companies, bonds, and
international holdings. The idea is to balance some lower risk, lower return
investments with other higher risk investments that could pay off big.
Moreover, ideally these investments will counterbalance each other, so that
when investors' stocks are performing poorly, their bonds will be earning
good returns. Within each asset class, it is safest to diversify as well. For
example, rather than buying the shares of two or three Fortune 500
companies, it is more prudent to buy an index fund that owns shares of each
of the 500 companies.
To review, retail investors are currently shut out of a significant asset
class: the private market.216 Yet public demand for such investments
exists. As Professor Steven Davidoff has documented, government
regulation has driven ordinary investors to pursue substitutes for private
212. See Gubler, supra note 130; see also Smith et al., supra note 206.
213. See Smith et al., supra note 206, at 421-22.
214. Id. at 427, 471-72.
215. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
216. There is at least one exception: GSV Capital. GSV is a publicly traded company
that invests in private shares via SharesPost and SecondMarket. Its website proudly
proclaims: "GSV Capital is democratizing access to VC-backed companies." GSV CAPITAL,
http://gsvcap.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). Because it is not a mutual fund, it does
not suffer from the same asset valuation problems that currently discourage secondary
market mutual funds. See Tomio Geron, GSV Capital Investment Values Facebook at $70
Billion, FORBES (June 27, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2011/06/
27/gsv-capital-investment-values-facebook-at-70-billion/.
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equity, which he terms "black market capital." 217  Such investments,
including investing in private equity firms themselves when they go public
or employing special purpose acquisition corporations, are imperfect
substitutes for true private equity.
The logical way in is through a fund that aggregates small investments in
different private companies, private equity funds, or hedge funds. One
alternative is to create a secondary market mutual fund. Although in theory
mutual funds could invest in the secondary market, in practice a
combination of SEC valuation rules and mutual fund requirements has
combined to discourage such investment. To understand the relevant rules
and regulations, readers should keep in mind that a key feature of the
typical mutual fund218 is that it permits shareholders to redeem their shares
for cash-in other words, mutual fund holders have the right to demand
money from the company in exchange for their shares at any time.219
Liquidity is thus a major concern for a mutual fund.
The SEC limits the amount of illiquid securities a mutual fund can hold
to 15 percent.220 Moreover, it requires that mutual funds value illiquid
assets "at the price that they would command upon a 'current sale'--or, in
other words, an immediate liquidation of these securities." 221 The board of
directors of the mutual fund must certify that the valuations are accurate,
thus exposing it to risk if the valuations are too high.222  While the
liquidation value is important given mutual funds' unique redemption
feature, imposing a liquidation measure of value fails to reflect the
underlying investment's value if the fund adopts a "buy and hold" strategy:
that is, if it plans not to trade the private company stock immediately, but
rather to wait for an IPO or trade sale. 223 Thus, the redemption feature and
its attendant need for liquidity at the fund level are in tension with the
illiquidity of the underlying assets of a fund that specializes in the
secondary market. Accordingly, such funds may want to limit the windows
when investors can exit, or impose redemption fees to discourage
withdrawal. 224  Some have suggested allowing mutual funds "more
latitude" in valuation, and perhaps alternatives to the certification
requirements. 225 The former choice is the more appealing to me, and
217. Davidoff, supra note 139, at 178-79.
218. By which I mean an open fund, as opposed to a closed-end fund. See infra notes
227-29 and accompanying text.
219. See John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Fund
Regulation, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 341, 348 (2012).
220. See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 521, 564 (2009).
221. Gubler, supra note 130, at 806; see also Smith et al., supra note 206, at 423.
222. Gubler, supra note 130, at 806.
223. See id.
224. Rule 22c-2 under the Investment Company Act permits the boards of companies that
redeem shares within 7 days to adopt a redemption fee of no more than 2 percent. 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.22c-2(a) (2012).
225. Gubler, supra note 130, at 807; Smith et al., supra note 206, at 467-69.
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perhaps could be coupled with requiring investors to affirm that they
understand the illiquidity of the underlying secondary fund's assets and the
difficulty involved in valuing them.
Alternatively, closed-end secondary market funds would not face the
same liquidity pressures as mutual funds.226 Unlike their mutual fund
counterparts, the shareholders of closed-end funds lack the right to redeem
their shares for cash.227 But they trade on the public securities exchanges in
a secondary market just like ordinary public companies. 228 The liquidation
value of these funds is thus less important than it is to mutual funds, 229
since selling shareholders will not be claiming their share of the fund's
assets from the fund itself (i.e., redeeming the shares), but rather selling
them on the secondary market at whatever price the market will bear.
Closed-end funds seem in many ways tailor-made for investment in the
private market, if only released from the liquidation measure of valuation
the SEC currently requires.
Moreover, public investment via secondary market funds may well prove
more attractive for private firms themselves. Even absent federal
regulations, most firms might well be loath to agree to small dollar value
investments from myriad average investors; the transaction costs alone
make the prospect unattractive, as compared to investments from wealthy
investors willing to buy large amounts of stock. Such reluctance may well
explain why, even though existing laws permit a limited number of
unaccredited investors to participate in private offerings, in practice few
private companies make use of them and actually sell to unaccrediteds. 230
Mutual fund mediation permits the agglomeration of unaccredited
investment dollars to the point where such investments might be more
palatable to private firms.
It may be that mutual fund managers' incentives need to be tweaked to
make such a change viable. Professor Paul Mahoney has identified the
agency problems inherent in tying mutual fund managers' compensation to
226. John P. Freeman, Stewart L. Brown & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees: New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 83, 114 n.107
(2008).
227. Morley, supra note 219, at 348.
228. Id.
229. Smith et al., supra note 206, at 434 ("Differences between NAV and market values
may be of little relevance to investors in closed-end funds that invest in restricted shares of
reporting companies. The fund's valuation methodology is likely to involve benchmarking
against the market values of freely tradable shares and is subject to the SEC's constraints.
As long as investors have access to specific information about the fund's holdings, the
board's valuation is unlikely to contribute to market valuation."); see also id. at 470 ("A
closed-end fund is essentially a publicly owned company. However, in contrast to publicly
owned companies, the fund must prepare its financial reports on the basis of liquidation
value, and not on the basis of historical cost. For healthy public corporations, it is easy to
see that liquidation value is not important to investors, who are attempting to determine
going-concern value." (citation omitted)).
230. See Campbell, supra note 171, at 98.
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the amount of trading. 231 If one views private equity's performance-based
incentive structure as a chief constraint on agency costs, then laws
precluding such compensation in the mutual fund industry become
problematic. Mahoney posits that federal regulations "unintentionally
exacerbate" fund manager/shareholder conflict by segregating sophisticated
and unsophisticated investors, allowing the former access to hedge funds
while relegating the latter to mutual funds, where fund managers use
creative techniques such as stale-price arbitrage and "soft dollar"
commissions to evade federal strictures on compensation. 232 Mahoney
suggests allowing retail investors to invest side by side with institutional
investors and relaxing the compensation structure in such funds to allow for
more experimentation in compensation. 233
If, despite my arguments, questions linger about the prudence of allowing
the general public into such risky assets-even in a diversified form-then
we could limit the public's exposure to this asset class to 10 percent of net
worth or income, mirroring the JOBS Act's "crowdfunding" provisions
(which allow little-guy investors to put a limited amount into small private
companies seeking up to $1 million in funds). 234 While it may seem at first
blush that CROWDIFUND is an accredited investor exemption for the
everyman, the opposite appears to be true. The traditional venture-backed
start-up requires several millions of dollars in funding.235 Most companies
that require less than $1 million are not your typical high-growth, get-in-on-
the-ground-floor investment. CROWDFUND does nothing to allow
average Joes into the traditional, and profitable, private market. Instead, it
creates new capital-raising opportunities for small business and start-ups-a
laudable goal, but not one that gives the retail investor access to traditional
accredited investor territory. In other words, even with CROWDFUND, the
real home runs are still reserved for the big wallets. Letting ordinary
investors into the private market, in contrast, gets ordinary investors a piece
of the action.
Such mutual funds could take on or reinforce aspects of the role angel
investors and VCs played in the traditional venture capital world described
231. Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. REv. 713,
716 (1995).
232. Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, J. EcoN. PERSP.,
Spring 2004, at 161, 179.
233. Id. at 180 (calling for a "mix of institutional and retail participation").
234. Title III of the JOBS Act, the CROWDFUND Act, allows issuers to sell up to $1
million of securities in a twelve-month period without 1933 Act registration. Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012). Any investor
can invest in these companies-they are not reserved for accrediteds only. If an investor's
annual net worth or income is less than $100,000, she can invest no more than 5 percent of
her net worth or annual income (or $2,000, whichever is greater). Id. § 302(a)(6)(B)(i). If an
investor's annual net worth or annual income is equal to or more than $100,000, then she can
invest no more than 10 percent of her net worth or annual income (or $100,000, whichever is
greater). Id. § 302(a)(6)(B)(ii).
235. See supra Part I.A.1-2.
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in Part I.A-the very role that the secondary markets currently threaten.
Because of the illiquid nature of their underlying assets, these mutual funds
would be motivated to ensure that the private equity funds in which they
invest are actually nurturing or at the very least monitoring their own
portfolio companies. To the extent that mutual funds invest directly in
private firms, they can assume the nurturing and monitoring role
themselves. In sum, the move to let the little guy into the private market via
mutual funds could benefit both investors and companies by introducing a
new institutional player with the capacity and incentive to effect real
change.
Allowing secondary market mutual funds would be a significant step, and
limiting the size of retail investors' investment to 10 percent of net worth, a
la CROWDFUND, might make it more politically palatable. Such
limitations ultimately invite a larger question: Why must investors be
protected from certain types of securities when they are free to lose their
life savings in the public markets or at casinos? Ultimately, any discussion
of limiting investor options invites a broader discussion of the
appropriateness of selective government intervention in certain investors'
lives. I save such questions for a later day.
E. Who Is Keeping Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret?
Given the potential benefits of allowing the retail investor into these
markets, the question might fairly be posed: Why does this stark divide
between investing haves and have-nots exist? Other countries have allowed
average citizens to invest in hedge funds.236 In other formerly off-limit
investment areas, such as options, futures, and real estate investment trusts,
investor demand has precipitated increased access.237 Yet in the United
States, unaccredited investors can only participate in the private market
indirectly via pension funds (for those lucky enough to still have pensions
at all).
Public choice theory provides one answer to this puzzle, although
perhaps a surprising one. The standard public choice story involves a rule
that the majority of voters disfavor, but a small interest group champions. 238
Widely dispersed, general voters are rationally ignorant regarding the issue
and equally rationally disinclined to educate themselves on it or to mount
an opposition. And so the interest group carries the day, succeeding in
236. See Shadab, supra note 191, at 253 (citing Australia, Switzerland, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Ireland, and the United Kingdom).
237. See Smith et al., supra note 206, at 460 & n.245.
238. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced
Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651 (1997) (reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS,
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997) (describing interest
group analysis public choice's "central insight" that concentrated interest groups often
benefit at the expense of a larger, more diffuse group, even when the latter group has more to
lose).
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lobbying to pass legislation or to persuade an agency to adopt a rule that
runs counter to the majority's preference. 239
The collective action side of the accredited investor exemption public
choice story is easy to tell. The typical retail investor spares little thought
for his investments in general and their scope in particular. Most investors
probably never even consider the possibility of investing in hedge funds,
private equity, or the shares of private companies. Indeed, the array of
investment opportunities already open to them is overwhelming. When
they set up an IRA or 401(k) (where the lion's share of investing decisions
are made for the average worker),240 no one tells them they cannot invest in
private equity-they are just never given the choice.
The special interest side of the public choice story is more difficult. As
Part II.A showed, private firms had every incentive to lobby Congress and
the SEC for a bright-line rule as to who was able to "fend for
themselves." 24 1 Such a rule did not really disempower small investors, who
had never previously been able to invest in these types of funds to begin
with. Instead, it merely crystallized the wealth levels needed to gain access
to privileged investments. The problem for retail investors, in other words,
is that from their perspective the accredited investor exemption is a tale of
inaction: while others were at the table clamoring for a share, they were
not. However, there has been a puzzling market failure on the part of
mutual funds since 1969-70 to lobby for changes to regulations that might
permit them to offer private company mutual funds to the public.
On the other hand, it is easy to explain the inaction of the SEC, the other
major player. As Gubler has pointed out, while conventional public
wisdom would suggest that the SEC would seek to enlarge its regulatory
turf at every turn-in order to gain currency its regulators can use to curry
favor with, and ultimately lucrative jobs from, private industry242-there
are good reasons for the SEC to hesitate to open up the private markets.
Private firms have not lobbied to expand the accredited investor definition
to the general public, and if they do not desire such reform-as may well be
the case, given the desire of private equity firms, in particular, to avoid the
limelight 243-then the potential for private gain on the part of regulators is
greatly diminished. Moreover, if average investors lost money in these
markets, the SEC would face withering criticism that it had failed in its
mandate of investor protection.
239. Id. at 652.
240. Accord Dana M. Muir, The U.S. Culture of Employee Ownership and 401(K) Plans,
14 ELDER L.J. 1, 9 (2006) ("By the end of 2003, an estimated 42 million employees
participated in 401(k) plans and plan assets totaled $1.9 trillion.").
241. See Karmel, supra note 174, at 686-87.
242. See Gubler, supra note 130, at 769.
243. See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 225, 278 (2007).
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Indeed, the "precautionary principle," which Commissioner Troy Paredes
points out may drive the SEC to regulate the hedge fund industry,244
counsels against increasing investor access to the private markets. When
rich widows and orphans lose their savings, people tut-tut. When it is poor
widows and orphans that suffer, regulators' heads may roll. Take the
fallout the SEC faced from failing to catch the fraud of Bernie Madoff and
then multiply it a hundredfold. Indeed, the scandals that so often drive
regulation all point the other way-toward limiting investment options
rather than expanding them. As long as differential investment access
remains a secret, there will be little pressure for change.
CONCLUSION
This Article has described the new secondary market for private shares,
which threatens to upset a tacit balance the securities markets have long
struck. The tradeoffs used to be pretty clear. If you were an ordinary
investor, you could buy shares of publicly traded corporations or funds that
invested in such corporations. You knew that these companies disclosed
massive quantities of information to the SEC and traded on national stock
exchanges that also kept an eye on the corporations' behavior. Thus, along
with your shares you bought some measure of safety and almost perfect
liquidity; if you needed to get out of your investment, you could do so at
minimal cost. Along with liquidity came the ability to diversify your
holdings. Putting your eggs in a number of baskets, you were less
vulnerable should any one basket be lost.
If you were an accredited investor, however, you could also invest in
private companies-companies that use special exemptions to sell their
securities without registering them with the SEC-thereby avoiding the
substantial accompanying costs and disclosure requirements. You could
invest in venture capital or private equity funds as well, pooling your
resources with other accredited investors to invest in early stage companies.
Private equity returns have at times spectacularly outstripped those of
publicly available investments.245 Other times they have underperformed
the market-by their nature, they are risky and volatile. 246 In the aggregate,
they offered valuable exposure to a unique asset class, contributing to the
diversification of the portfolios of those privileged to be able to invest in
them. But generally these funds require a ten-year or longer commitment.
Thus, the tradeoff: in the old world, accredited investors had special
access to private investments that promised higher returns, but they
accepted diminished liquidity as a price of their investment. Generally, if
you wanted to invest in private corporations, you had to be not only rich but
244. See Paredes, supra note 198, at 1006-07.
245. Nathan Williams, Private-Equity Returns Don't Outperform Public Markets, Study
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also patient. And in part because of this de facto illiquidity, these investors
were seen as bringing "smart money" to the table. Put another way, these
investors were sophisticated repeat players, but they were also motivated to
monitor the company's performance. Heeding Mark Twain's advice,
traditional accredited investors put lots of eggs in one basket-and then
watched that basket.247
The secondary markets mean that private investors no longer need watch
their baskets quite so closely. Now the rich but dumb money can invest in
private firms, potentially at the expense of the companies themselves, who
may lose both the soft nurturing and the chance to raise cold hard cash that
the old system afforded them. Now the rich have liquidity and special
access to privileged investments. If this new bargain, coupled with the
increased visibility these markets and recent changes in the law provide,
proves less tenable than the old one, then perhaps it is time to revisit some
basic assumptions undergirding our securities laws.
247. See MARK TWAIN, THE TRAGEDY OF PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 197 (1894) ("Put all your
eggs in the one basket and-WATCH THAT BASKET.").
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